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The problem with cloud-sync-based managers like the iCloud Keychain is bootstrapping. Since you need to be able to log in to the services themselves to provisio
by jabbany 3y ago
The problem with cloud-sync-based managers like the iCloud Keychain is bootstrapping. Since you need to be able to log in to the services themselves to provision access to the passwords.
This makes travelling a bit risky, since it's not that hard to lose/break/have your devices stolen during a random trip. This makes it immensely hard to recover, since you cannot just hop onto a public terminal and authenticate (which might involve entering 2FA codes etc that you cannot get anymore).
This is why physical tokens are still quite useful. They're rather unattractive to thieves, don't require its own Internet connection to work, and they're relatively small and cheap so you can get a bunch them to stuff in various places increasing your chances of having one still available to you.
- froggit 3y ago"It's easy to lose devices when you travel so just get a shit ton of devices. If you're a big enough of a fuckup to lose them all then you've got bigger life problems anyway." I like good advice that, upon hearing it, seems obvious enough it can be misinterpreted as a dig at one's competence. I'm much more likely to follow it and get my ass saved (I'm the kind of medium grade fuckup that would lose all but one of them).
- thrashh 3y agoKnowing ahead of that problem, you can plan a solution though? Everything I have is cloud-synced and even if I lose my phone right now in a random country, I definitely know how I can recover all my 2FA tokens and logins from a random terminal (or preferably a new boxed phone) -- I DO have to remember some passcodes which I otherwise never use but that's not too hard. If Google or Apple implements this, they can design a solution too.
- jabbany 3y ago> I DO have to remember some passcodes which I otherwise never use but that's not too hard. Right, but you're giving up a lot of security to do this, since it implies with these rare passcodes someone else could also bootstrap your logins. With HW tokens, you don't have to worry about recovery passcodes being leaked/hacked (the recommended procedure today is to print out the recovery codes and destroy digital copies).
- tsimionescu 3y agoThis idea of printing out recovery codes seems so deeply out of touch with basically everyone leading a modern digital life that I can't believe serious security experts actually recommend it with a straight face. No one has a printer anymore, and I'm sure as hell not including a trip to a local printshop as a part of signing up to 2FA for some random site (yes, even Gmail).
- froggit 3y agograb a pen and something to write on (worst case: buy a pen and write on receipt paper). write down single recovery code to cloud storage thingy. store other recovery codes there.
- bombolo 3y agoPrint the recovery codes! For security! Of course to do that I need to go to a public library where I have no idea if they keep copies, and where someone might mistakenly take them from the printer, which is very far away from the computer you must use to print.
- froggit 3y agoDon't explicitly label the codes with their corresponding accounts on the print out, just print the actual codes. Write the corresponding accounts in later. Recovery codes don't do much unless you know where to use them.
- yomlica8 3y agoCan't you just print them to PDF?
- tatersolid 3y agoAnd store that PDF where? Inside your Google drive which you can’t access within your t that PDF? On the same device you just lost? If you suggest “on a thumb drive kept offline” you’ve just recreated all the problems of physical FIDO keys without offering any phishing protection.