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The idea that Russia can just march its soldiers into Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova is bad for European security. It just is. All you need for proof of that is
by dragontamer 3y ago
The idea that Russia can just march its soldiers into Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova is bad for European security.
It just is. All you need for proof of that is Finland and Sweden, who reacted very strongly to the invasion of Ukraine to join NATO.
Russia will do what Russia does. And we need to come up with plans to protect our allies. Ideally, Europe would be strong enough to defend themselves but USA's overwhelming military could use less than those 5% or 3% numbers you were talking about there to help our our European friends.
Its very cheap from the USA perspective, and provides plenty of assurances of raw, brutal defense. The kind of which Russia (and China) cannot ignore.
And ignore they will. No amount of signatures on the Budapest Memorandum prevented Putin from invading Ukraine.
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There's nothing "unstable" about Ukraine fighting for its survival. The unstable part is Russia invading Ukraine. The question is how to stop Russia from invading other countries.
The answer is to stop Russia in Ukraine. If Russia is stopped here, they won't attack other countries. Its really that simple.
- remarkEon 3y agoWe're venturing into tautology territory here, I think, but I can see where we agree. I think getting the European NATO members to pony up and develop their own defense capabilities is long overdue, because there's been a bit of a free-rider problem since the end of the Cold War. Partially this is the result of a general failure of US leadership to posit what, exactly, NATO is supposed to be absent an Iron Curtain in Europe. I also vehemently agree that, in terms of dollars spent, this has been probably the greatest return on R&D dollars spent by US defense since WWII and has exposed pretty wide gaps in procurement (in fairness many have known and been screaming about these gaps for a while, but now they can't be explained away as not important "because War on Terror"). Where I think we part ways is probably at the definition of "stop". We've basically stalemated, with Russia getting no support from abroad and Ukraine getting extensive support from NATO and the US especially. Is a stalemate a "stop"? Is it "return to pre-war borders"? Is it "Crimea is back under control of Ukraine"? Is it "Ukraine is in NATO"? No one can really say, and that's where the unknown unknowns exist. For what it's worth, I actually agree with some who say that Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO already, but making them a de jure member must, absolutely must mean that all members wish to fight WWIII over the Donbass. That's a hard sell for normal people.
- dragontamer 3y agoWith only a few dozen billion/year being spent on this, I don't see any reason why USA should think of stopping. Even if this goes on for the next 20 years, we'd have spent less on the Ukrainian war than a single year of Afghanistan. ----------- We still man the South Korean line, hold drills and protect them because protecting the South Koreans from the North Koreans is in our interests (and in the interests of pretty much every Android developer)
- remarkEon 3y agoSouth Korea is a bad example because there's an enormous amount of physical and human capital on that peninsula that is actually critical to our interests. The Korean War also had nothing to do with NATO. >With only a few dozen billion/year being spent on this, I don't see any reason why USA should think of stopping. In a nutshell, that's my problem here. There really is no end game. We could evaporate 25% of Ukrainian and Russian fighting age men in this conflict, and you could still make the argument that "we just gotta test that new weapons system" or "to Sevastopol, or Moldova will be next, I promise". We just got out of a pointless 20 year conflict, and now the best steelman we can come up with is "this time a forever war is good actually".
- lisasays 3y agoThere really is no end game. And elsewhere: What is the stop? No one can really say. This seems like a strange thing to say, given this war has a very clear and obvious metric (apart from people or materiel). Which has been, since after the 3rd week or so, moving monotonically in Ukraine's favor; sometimes slowly like now, at other times very quickly; but never oscillating or swinging back in Russia's favor. There's also the matter of Putin's own impending demise or convalescence, not too far off -- and the inevitable consequences this will bring. So not only does the war have a clear "stop" -- it has a built-in expiration date. There are still unknowns, and things could go either way. But it's not like there's no very clearly defined "goal", especially for Ukraine. Or no way to measure velocity towards that goal.