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My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European secu

My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European security is increased (or at least stabilized). It's a weird inversion to me to think that prolonging a large land war somehow actually increases this hypothetical security, which it demonstrably doesn't as weapons flood the region and refugees flee their homes. >By making sure that Russia is stopped in Ukraine, then we save Moldova. To this point on Moldova ... Probably less than 1% of Americans could find Moldova on a map without googling. Probably less than 5% of congressmen. Pretending that it's existence outside of Russia's sphere of influence is some critical part of this war effort is downright preposterous. Maybe that's how some people steelman it, but I don't buy it. Moreover, pretending that Moldova is a critical part of the US sphere of influence is even more preposterous. Again, I don't disagree that degrading/destroying Russian combat power has some benefits for the US' ability to project power abroad (i.e. in the Pacific), and some benefits for weapons systems evaluation. I just simply don't buy these contortions that the US security sphere extends globally and any country that has weak sovereignty is now a US protectorate. ----- Something appears to have happened post Cold War (probably related to 9/11 and the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) that has caused a lot of Americans (apologies if you are not one) to reflexively want to "do something!!" about this war. It's, I think, started to jade a longer term historical perspective about why nations go to war in the first place and leads to situations like this, where we have to actively come up with reasons to continue a war in Europe because ending it would be "bad". If the war ended tomorrow with the current borders as they are today, it's not like the history books would think of Russia as the good guys or a neutral party.

dragonwriter 3y ago
> My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European security is increased (or at least stabilized). It's a weird inversion to me to think that prolonging a large land war somehow actually increases this hypothetical security The thing kind of hinges on whether you consider the Russian invasions of (so far) Georgia and Ukraine separate, narrowly bounded wars with no consequences for each beyond their boundaries, and no context, or if you see them as a single expanding pattern of aggression directly responding to particular opportunities created by perceived lack of willingness of the international community to constrain further aggression. Did the Munich Peace Agreement avoid a war in 1938 over the Sudetenland? Sure. Did it contribute positively to European stability and security in any but the shortest possible term? I think most would agree the answer is “no,” Chamberlain’s triumphant declaration of “Peace for our time” aside.
dragontamer 3y ago
The idea that Russia can just march its soldiers into Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova is bad for European security. It just is. All you need for proof of that is Finland and Sweden, who reacted very strongly to the invasion of Ukraine to join NATO. Russia will do what Russia does. And we need to come up with plans to protect our allies. Ideally, Europe would be strong enough to defend themselves but USA's overwhelming military could use less than those 5% or 3% numbers you were talking about there to help our our European friends. Its very cheap from the USA perspective, and provides plenty of assurances of raw, brutal defense. The kind of which Russia (and China) cannot ignore. And ignore they will. No amount of signatures on the Budapest Memorandum prevented Putin from invading Ukraine. --------------- There's nothing "unstable" about Ukraine fighting for its survival. The unstable part is Russia invading Ukraine. The question is how to stop Russia from invading other countries. The answer is to stop Russia in Ukraine. If Russia is stopped here, they won't attack other countries. Its really that simple.
- remarkEon 3y ago
  We're venturing into tautology territory here, I think, but I can see where we agree. I think getting the European NATO members to pony up and develop their own defense capabilities is long overdue, because there's been a bit of a free-rider problem since the end of the Cold War. Partially this is the result of a general failure of US leadership to posit what, exactly, NATO is supposed to be absent an Iron Curtain in Europe. I also vehemently agree that, in terms of dollars spent, this has been probably the greatest return on R&D dollars spent by US defense since WWII and has exposed pretty wide gaps in procurement (in fairness many have known and been screaming about these gaps for a while, but now they can't be explained away as not important "because War on Terror"). Where I think we part ways is probably at the definition of "stop". We've basically stalemated, with Russia getting no support from abroad and Ukraine getting extensive support from NATO and the US especially. Is a stalemate a "stop"? Is it "return to pre-war borders"? Is it "Crimea is back under control of Ukraine"? Is it "Ukraine is in NATO"? No one can really say, and that's where the unknown unknowns exist. For what it's worth, I actually agree with some who say that Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO already, but making them a de jure member must, absolutely must mean that all members wish to fight WWIII over the Donbass. That's a hard sell for normal people.

dragonwriter 3y ago

> My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European security is increased (or at least stabilized). It's a weird inversion to me to think that prolonging a large land war somehow actually increases this hypothetical security The thing kind of hinges on whether you consider the Russian invasions of (so far) Georgia and Ukraine separate, narrowly bounded wars with no consequences for each beyond their boundaries, and no context, or if you see them as a single expanding pattern of aggression directly responding to particular opportunities created by perceived lack of willingness of the international community to constrain further aggression. Did the Munich Peace Agreement avoid a war in 1938 over the Sudetenland? Sure. Did it contribute positively to European stability and security in any but the shortest possible term? I think most would agree the answer is “no,” Chamberlain’s triumphant declaration of “Peace for our time” aside.

dragontamer 3y ago

The idea that Russia can just march its soldiers into Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova is bad for European security. It just is. All you need for proof of that is Finland and Sweden, who reacted very strongly to the invasion of Ukraine to join NATO. Russia will do what Russia does. And we need to come up with plans to protect our allies. Ideally, Europe would be strong enough to defend themselves but USA's overwhelming military could use less than those 5% or 3% numbers you were talking about there to help our our European friends. Its very cheap from the USA perspective, and provides plenty of assurances of raw, brutal defense. The kind of which Russia (and China) cannot ignore. And ignore they will. No amount of signatures on the Budapest Memorandum prevented Putin from invading Ukraine. --------------- There's nothing "unstable" about Ukraine fighting for its survival. The unstable part is Russia invading Ukraine. The question is how to stop Russia from invading other countries. The answer is to stop Russia in Ukraine. If Russia is stopped here, they won't attack other countries. Its really that simple.

remarkEon 3y ago
We're venturing into tautology territory here, I think, but I can see where we agree. I think getting the European NATO members to pony up and develop their own defense capabilities is long overdue, because there's been a bit of a free-rider problem since the end of the Cold War. Partially this is the result of a general failure of US leadership to posit what, exactly, NATO is supposed to be absent an Iron Curtain in Europe. I also vehemently agree that, in terms of dollars spent, this has been probably the greatest return on R&D dollars spent by US defense since WWII and has exposed pretty wide gaps in procurement (in fairness many have known and been screaming about these gaps for a while, but now they can't be explained away as not important "because War on Terror"). Where I think we part ways is probably at the definition of "stop". We've basically stalemated, with Russia getting no support from abroad and Ukraine getting extensive support from NATO and the US especially. Is a stalemate a "stop"? Is it "return to pre-war borders"? Is it "Crimea is back under control of Ukraine"? Is it "Ukraine is in NATO"? No one can really say, and that's where the unknown unknowns exist. For what it's worth, I actually agree with some who say that Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO already, but making them a de jure member must, absolutely must mean that all members wish to fight WWIII over the Donbass. That's a hard sell for normal people.