3 ms·
> But if you're a human being - this seems like a whole lot of hassle to... protect against evildoers breaking into your hotel room and replacing your CPU? Sec
by mschuster91 3y ago
> But if you're a human being - this seems like a whole lot of hassle to... protect against evildoers breaking into your hotel room and replacing your CPU?
Secure Boot - if done right - also prevents malware that gains root access by whatever mechanism of privilege escalation from persisting within the kernel address space.
Another, more ethically questionable requirement is RF laws. Basically some jurisdictions require as part of certification criteria that a transmission-capable device be protected against someone overriding legal limitations for frequency bands or transmission strengths. There's no way out for device manufacturers other than a complete chain of trust including a trusted way to provide a location (to prevent the user from setting a location with higher transmission limits).
- electroly 3y ago> RF laws ... There's no way out for device manufacturers other than a complete chain of trust ... You make the baseband processor physically separate from the app processor and run it off of firmware that the application processor can't reflash. All phones do this. Then it doesn't matter what boots up on the app processor, and only the baseband processor has to be certified. Nobody is trying to obey RF laws using Secure Boot on the application processor. There are other reasons for Secure Boot on the AP but this isn't one of them.
- immibis 3y agoThere are more laws than RF laws, anyway. Why don't we trust application processors to obey RF laws, but we trust them to obey copyright laws and port scanning laws?
- electroly 3y agoRF laws have teeth and enforcement and the other laws don't. You get in actual trouble if your device violates FCC broadcast regulations, and you have to get your device certified before you're allowed to sell it. There's no law that gets you, the device manufacturer, in trouble if someone hacks your device and gets it to port scan or violate copyright, and no mandatory certification that those things are impossible on your device. Hell, you won't even get in trouble for doing the copyright infringement yourself (e.g. GPL violations). Ditto for literally shipping app-side malware from the factory (e.g. sketchy Chinese phones).
- gary_0 3y agoAlso, knowing whether copyright or the CFAA has been violated might require a lengthy court case between the accused and the purported legitimate owner. RF violations are an FCC guy with an antenna telling you to cut it out. Everything is explicitly licensed by the Feds ahead of time, copyright and computer access usually isn't.
- mschuster91 3y agoAs soon as a manufacturer allows untrusted code to say "you're in country X" to the modem/wifi firmware, it's hard to keep up with the requirement of not exceeding emission limits.
- pydry 3y agoThe main goal behind secure boot was a nod and a wink to the OEMs ("nice business you've got there") to introduce just enough friction into the process of installing Linux to inhibit it without being overt enough to attract unwanted attention. It's a neat trick coz they can put pressure on the OEMs to introduce that friction. They can subtly reward that but fully disclaim responsibility for it when they overdo it (which at least one OEM has done). The actual security concerns it deals with (e.g. evil maid attacks) aren't entirely imagined but they're played up.
- mschuster91 3y ago> The actual security concerns it deals with (e.g. evil maid attacks) aren't entirely imagined but they're played up. Not really. God knows what the US CBP does to your devices if you hand them over at border control - which is why I refuse (and every other IT professional should as well) to travel to the US until that is taken back. Pry my devices from my cold dead hands.
- JohnFen 3y agoAs a US citizen, flying domestically or internationally, what I do is to not take my electronic devices with me. If I need them where I'm going, I ship them ahead via a parcel carrier. On the plane trip itself, I use a burner phone that has no data on it aside from the record of what calls I may have placed or received during that trip. It's rather sad that these precautions are needed, but here we are. I'm just bringing all this up to say that there are ways of travelling without having to put your devices at risk of compromise.
- mschuster91 3y agoFor you as an US citizen that works out, they can't deny you entry - but I'd rather not risk the parcel with my device getting lost in the post or stolen, or getting refused entry and being deported (and thus, losing the many thousand dollars one needs for a vacation in the US) for being "suspicious". And there's the entire import duty/customs stuff to work out as well...
- StillBored 3y agoAnd as I understand it, that is the problem with MOK. In the case of secure boot, the signing key is kept far away in a MS vault. Making it basically impossible to put something in the secure boot chain without actively re-compromising the machine on every reboot. This can be replicated by the end owner, if they replace the MS keys in the secure boot chain as well. But in order to make it as secure, they need the infrastructure to assure that the boot/kernel/etc is all signed on a secure machine somewhere entirely firewalled off from the machines running the signed code. So, AFAIK, shim/MOK, breaks all this. As a root user it then becomes possible to enroll custom keys that allow a 3rd party, or the machine owner (or exploiter) to add code to the boot path nullifying its greatest strength IMHO, which is protecting the boot chain from a root level exploit. At that point the only protection would be a TPM + 3rd party root of trust, that notices the shim measurement of the next stage isn't one that has been reported "safe". Which doesn't exist in linux land, outside of possibly some large corps that have taken ownership of the entire thing for their own internal purposes.
- mjg59 3y agoEnrolling an MOK requires physical access, so no, a root compromise isn't sufficient to change the boot security chain.
- michaelt 3y ago...unless you've already got a MOK enrolled. For example, to install DKMS modules like nvidia drivers. Or indeed to exercise your right to run any code you like on the system you own.
- mjg59 3y agoYes, if you change the security state of your system, its security state is changed. This is, uh, unsurprising?