6 ms·
Roots of trust are difficult
- fsflover 3y agoI don't understand why Heads and Pureboot are not mentioned here, which are FLOSS: https://docs.puri.sm/PureBoot/Heads.html#heads https://docs.puri.sm/PureBoot/Heads.html#heads.
- c0l0 3y agoThis seems to have been written under the assumption that these "elaborate security implementations" discussed are designed to serve the interests of the owner (or, these days, let's better call that person the "user" instead?) of the particular machine/hardware/node. I do not share that sentiment, and believe they are designed and implemented to service the interests of the content industry and their ilk, and purported benefits for Joe User are a pretty much a gigantic fig leaf.
- smashed 3y agoYup, and in the embedded world, they are used to achieve encryption of the OS firmware, thus preventing reverse engineering of the device, protecting IP and securing devices through obscurity. I'm thinking of enterprise grade networking hardware for example. Their main OS ROM is encrypted and they will refuse to decrypt if the boot process is altered. There are no real secrets or user data being protected by the encryption. Heck, actual passwords and user configurations can be stored in clear.
- vetinari 3y agoIt is not for protecting user secrets. It has nothing to do with users. It is about protecting against "after hours" production runs. If you, as a vendor, order manufacturing 1000 pieces of widgets, you want to be sure that only those delivered to you are really produced. You don't want more, and then your own product competing against you on the market. Hence, encryption. Only your devices can run your firmware. All those extras cannot.
- salawat 3y agoSolution: Make your own fab? Enjoy all the benefits of keeping stuff to yourself I guess. Bonus: potentially lowers the barrier to entry to electronics fabrication as more engineer hours are spent getting the fabrication equipment/processes better documented/more accessible. No one wants that though. That'd make too much sense.
- immibis 3y agoIt's both. Whoever gets a hold of a secure boot system first can ensure the machine serves them. How else can the machine tell who is its rightful owner?
- rocqua 3y agoOwners and users are different people in the case of enterprise issued devices, which is a very common use cases for things like this. In that case the user isn't trusted, not because of maliciousness, but because of security mistakes, which are quite easy to make. Having attestation to prove the device is not tampered with before letting it connect to the company network is a good idea.
- benlivengood 3y agoFoolproof root of trust would make cloud providers a lot more trustworthy. For example AMD's SME+SEV is in theory able to attest that a cryptographically verified (as opposed to trusted) boot process resulted in an encrypted-RAM VM running on someone else's computer that it would be pretty hard for them to impersonate or read data from (they can always inject errors). It's always up to the person evaluating the measured attestation to determine the trust in the software that was attested. Individuals don't have quite as much to benefit from. I don't bother to run SEV on my personal cloud VMs. Mostly because it's more likely for there to be enough software 0-days to not offer much practical protection. If I was trying to do cryptocurrency in the cloud on top of seL4 or something equally verifiable then maybe SEV/SecureBoot would be worth it?
- temptemptemp111 3y ago[dead]
- evntdrvn 3y agoOxide has described some stuff around their Root of Trust implementation: https://oxide.computer/blog/exploiting-undocumented-hardware-blocks-in-the-lpc55s69 https://oxide.computer/blog/exploiting-undocumented-hardware...
- michaelt 3y ago> when I say "trustworthy", it is very easy to interpret this in a cynical manner and assume that "trust" means "trusted by someone I do not necessarily trust to act in my best interest". I want to be absolutely clear that when I say "trustworthy" I mean "trusted by the owner of the computer" [...] > Of course, simply measuring the fact that verified boot was enabled isn't enough - what if someone replaces the CPU with one that has verified boot enabled, but trusts keys under their control? We also need to measure the keys that were used The motivation for this stuff has always seemed pretty weird to me. Out of the box, secure boot means your PC only boots things signed by Microsoft. Microsoft has deigned to sign a 'shim' which lets you boot Linux - so long as your kernel is signed by a vendor with Microsoft's blessing, like Canonical. Otherwise, you've got to go into the BIOS and disable Secure Boot - or enrol your own MOK, a similarly manual process, with similar security impact. I get why this stuff is useful for big corporations making TiVo-ized products, wanting to lock out the device owners. For them, I get that this tech is great. But if you're a human being - this seems like a whole lot of hassle to... protect against evildoers breaking into your hotel room and replacing your CPU?
- hardware2win 3y agoA lot of hassle?
- mschuster91 3y ago> But if you're a human being - this seems like a whole lot of hassle to... protect against evildoers breaking into your hotel room and replacing your CPU? Secure Boot - if done right - also prevents malware that gains root access by whatever mechanism of privilege escalation from persisting within the kernel address space. Another, more ethically questionable requirement is RF laws. Basically some jurisdictions require as part of certification criteria that a transmission-capable device be protected against someone overriding legal limitations for frequency bands or transmission strengths. There's no way out for device manufacturers other than a complete chain of trust including a trusted way to provide a location (to prevent the user from setting a location with higher transmission limits).
- 3y ago
- taeric 3y agoSo much in computing is made difficult by the assumption that solutions can be evergreen. Foundations are best stable, as in unchanging. But few foundations can live up to that. Indeed, with our knowledge of how the very earth is dynamic, it is funny that we maintain the ideas of foundational stability on it.
- gchadwick 3y agoWorth pointing out OpenTitan (which I work on) here: www.opentitan.org, www.github.com/lowrisc/opentitan It's an open silicon root of trust. All the RTL (systemverilog code that describes the hardware), DV (design verification, which is used to demonstrate the functional correctness of the design so you are confident in building a chip with it), documentation and software is open source and available on the repo linked above. Being able to trust your root of trust is obviously vital and current implementations are proprietary and heavy NDAs required to get any more detail. With OpenTitan you can go as deep as you want to understand what's actually going on.
- nsajko 3y agoThis is still aimed at megacorps, not at your average hacker without a semiconductor fab handy.
- klysm 3y agoI mean of course it is? I’m not sure what you mean by “still”. I don’t see how it could ever be aimed at your average hacker.
- RealityVoid 3y agoGive it some time. I think it's possible that sometime down the line you'll get asics the same way you get PCB's ordered now.
- gnufx 3y agoMaybe not quite the same space, but bunnie's Precursor uses an FPGA instead: https://betrusted.io/ https://betrusted.io/