3 ms·

Because it’s not good, it’s bad. “Let the perfect not be the enemy of the good” applies to schemes like the Web PKI or phone numbers as identities in E2E chatti

Because it’s not good, it’s bad. “Let the perfect not be the enemy of the good” applies to schemes like the Web PKI or phone numbers as identities in E2E chatting schemes, not to things that outright don’t work. (You’ll note that even the simplest single sender case here assumes both key distribution and stable keys for users, neither of which PGP makes easy.)

reaperman 3y ago
Key distribution is the (unsolvable?) weak point for targeted warrants/etc. But still prevents wholesale slurping of data from everyone.
- woodruffw 3y ago
  I don’t understand what warrants have to do with key distribution. The problem here is much simpler than that: you can’t encrypt to me if you don’t know my key. PGP doesn’t give you a sound way to get my key; every mechanism offered by the larger PGP ecosystem is either broken or disabled due to persistent abuse.
  - reaperman 3y ago
    PGP protects against warrants if done well. But if gmail.com has a system to force-push new keys (which it basically has to do, receiver of key could get option to reject but everyone will just click "yes, accept updated public key for this contact"), then a warrant can force Gmail to utilize their existing system to push a MITM key and intercept encrypted email.
    - woodruffw 3y ago
      Why are we proposing schemes that are broken from the outset? As others have pointed out: Signal (among others) does not have these problems. These problems occur because email was not meant to be encrypted (or signed); efforts to do so result in these kinds of convoluted “maybe secure, maybe not” models. If we want people to be able to communicate privately, we should be encouraging them to use protocols that are meant that purpose.
      - reaperman 3y ago
        I'm not sure signal actually solves the key distribution issue, it re-issues keys for users semi-often which have a feature to verify the new keys, but most users won't. It also has a potential frontend distribution problem through the App Store (apple/google could be compelled to distribute a compromised Signal App to specific users).
        tomatocracy 3y ago
        Theoretically at least Android has a TOFU-like system where the developer signs the app (although Google also has a product where Google manage the keys which developers can sign up for). That doesn't help people who are specifically targeted as it's within Google's control on most devices to change that via updates to system components or to hold back critical security updates selectively via the Play Store channel but it does raise the bar a bit.
        bombolo 3y ago
        I am really suspicious of signal, just because it's promoted so much. I think it is secure, if, you don't install it via google and you actually do verify your contacts, but the NSA might relying on the fact that most people will not.
nmilo 3y ago
That's why it was proposed iCloud or whatever big tech provider does the key distribution, just like they do for iMessage. It would be a big win for Apple if they actually cared about privacy. But maybe it's just a pipe dream.
- woodruffw 3y ago
  People keep proposing this as if federated key distribution is easy, and as if iCloud could with sheer force of will can just do it correctly. There is a reason nobody serious is trying to make email encryption work: secure messaging is already incredibly hard when you control every piece of the system; with email, you control absolutely nothing.

reaperman 3y ago

Key distribution is the (unsolvable?) weak point for targeted warrants/etc. But still prevents wholesale slurping of data from everyone.

woodruffw 3y ago
I don’t understand what warrants have to do with key distribution. The problem here is much simpler than that: you can’t encrypt to me if you don’t know my key. PGP doesn’t give you a sound way to get my key; every mechanism offered by the larger PGP ecosystem is either broken or disabled due to persistent abuse.
- reaperman 3y ago
  PGP protects against warrants if done well. But if gmail.com has a system to force-push new keys (which it basically has to do, receiver of key could get option to reject but everyone will just click "yes, accept updated public key for this contact"), then a warrant can force Gmail to utilize their existing system to push a MITM key and intercept encrypted email.
  - woodruffw 3y ago
    Why are we proposing schemes that are broken from the outset? As others have pointed out: Signal (among others) does not have these problems. These problems occur because email was not meant to be encrypted (or signed); efforts to do so result in these kinds of convoluted “maybe secure, maybe not” models. If we want people to be able to communicate privately, we should be encouraging them to use protocols that are meant that purpose.
    - reaperman 3y ago
      I'm not sure signal actually solves the key distribution issue, it re-issues keys for users semi-often which have a feature to verify the new keys, but most users won't. It also has a potential frontend distribution problem through the App Store (apple/google could be compelled to distribute a compromised Signal App to specific users).
      - tomatocracy 3y ago
        Theoretically at least Android has a TOFU-like system where the developer signs the app (although Google also has a product where Google manage the keys which developers can sign up for). That doesn't help people who are specifically targeted as it's within Google's control on most devices to change that via updates to system components or to hold back critical security updates selectively via the Play Store channel but it does raise the bar a bit.
      - bombolo 3y ago
        I am really suspicious of signal, just because it's promoted so much. I think it is secure, if, you don't install it via google and you actually do verify your contacts, but the NSA might relying on the fact that most people will not.

nmilo 3y ago

That's why it was proposed iCloud or whatever big tech provider does the key distribution, just like they do for iMessage. It would be a big win for Apple if they actually cared about privacy. But maybe it's just a pipe dream.

woodruffw 3y ago
People keep proposing this as if federated key distribution is easy, and as if iCloud could with sheer force of will can just do it correctly. There is a reason nobody serious is trying to make email encryption work: secure messaging is already incredibly hard when you control every piece of the system; with email, you control absolutely nothing.