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I don't think what Native Client does is the same as "proof carrying code". From what I gather, if it used proof carrying code, then it would do some verificat
by chubot 15y ago
I don't think what Native Client does is the same as "proof carrying code". From what I gather, if it used proof carrying code, then it would do some verification on the receiving side at "compile time", and no sandbox for runtime checks would be necessary.
My understanding is that Native Client works with a combination of a special compiler toolchain (on the sending side) and runtime checks on the receiving side.
https://developers.google.com/native-client/pepper16/overview#how-nacl-works https://developers.google.com/native-client/pepper16/overvie...
Happy to see any corrections. Your link seems to show a project that is related to NativeClient, but is not the core technology behind NativeClient.
EDIT: Also, I would be interested in details about the Microsoft driver thing, but that doesn't seem related to proof carrying code either.
- sanxiyn 15y agoI think he is referring to Microsoft Static Driver Verifier(SDV). It is a great research, actually being applied right now. http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/slam/ http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/slam/
- larsberg 15y agoYou are correct --- PCC (AFAIK) has not come about in the sense of carrying along a proof object that a formal verifier can validate is both correct and corresponds to the code payload. As the other commenter pointed out, the SLAM tools are part of the Windows Device Driver Development Kit. The last time I talked to the kit's dev manager (~2003), they were talking about making it mandatory that you pass the formal verification in order to have your driver signed by Microsoft. Since those signatures are then verified at driver installation time, that feels very close to it! I have to confess I'm only familiar with the publications on Native Client and not the actual product. From what I'd read, I understood that the verifier did some basic static analysis to prove that all possible executions did not validate some properties. In that case, no proof object is required, as the source code itself is the proof object. Assuming, of course, that they're actually doing the stuff talked about in the papers and in practice don't just "grep for dangerous instructions."