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> Self signed certificates should not throw up a warning on sites that don't deal with sensitive data. I would have went with a slightly different suggestion:

• ComputerGuru 3y ago
  Absolutely. Submitted: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36589269 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36589269
• woodruffw 3y ago
  > Self signed certificates should not throw up any warnings that wouldn't appear for the same site visited over insecure HTTP, since the latter is strictly more dangerous. For an unknown server, they're strictly equivalent: trusting a self-signed certificate is the canonical "private chat with the devil" example. You could argue that it prevents some other unknown adversary from reading your traffic on the line, but that's a weird threat model (why would an adversary even bother, when you'll accept any certificate they give you?). More fundamentally: a policy among browsers to trust self-signed certs if the only other option is HTTP is way easier for an adversary to MiTM: instead of attacking TLS itself, they can redirect your entire connection to an inauthentic server with a self-signed certificate. Not throwing up any warnings for that case would mean that browsers would automatically trust the inauthentic server.
  • josephcsible 3y ago
    > a policy among browsers to trust self-signed certs if the only other option is HTTP I'm not arguing to remove warnings when going to a site with a self-signed cert. I'm arguing to add warnings to insecure HTTP until it's at least as scary as going to a site with a self-signed cert is today.