4 ms·
Not to knock on the author's article, but I've never seen a code encryption technique or assembler-level obfuscation that wasn't trivial to remove. If you're lo
by stcredzero 15y ago
Not to knock on the author's article, but I've never seen a code encryption technique or assembler-level obfuscation that wasn't trivial to remove. If you're looking for protection technologies that perform well in the real world, look into Source Level obfuscation, Virtual Machines, and Antidebug tricks.
They're all "trivial" to remove for a given value of "trivial." What you can do is to detect whether or not exactly the intended code is running, and you can only get away with this for awhile if you separate the detection from any visible consequences by a significant time span.
Also interesting to see an article like this on the front page of HN...
We've seen things like this time and again: Technology X fails at task Z. The conventional wisdom is that technology X is somehow hopeless in the entire problem domain. Everyone is scared of using technology X. Someone realizes that technology X >can< be used for task Y, but everyone just laughs at him and spouts the conventional wisdom.
It's easy to recognize things like this in hindsight. What's hard is to recognize them ahead of time and to profit from the information asymmetry. For this reason, I think this is appropriate for the front page of HN.