> The [Chinese] military is very firmly under Party control. The point about the military-industrial complex capturing politicians isn't about control, but rat

> The [Chinese] military is very firmly under Party control. The point about the military-industrial complex capturing politicians isn't about control, but rather excess procurement. On the one hand, China has a long way to reach parity with the US. On the other hand, they're building extremely quickly, and that means lots of government money going to corporations. Subsequent restrictions to that funding flow tend to be when the system pushes back. > Germany, Japan and South Korea have been fantastic successes in nation building. These are all nation re-building efforts: they existed as economically and politically strong entities before the respective wars. > The Taiwan situation has to be escalated, and territorial claims in the South China Sea pushed in order to manufacture tensions that justify internal repression. I don't pretend to understand China's calculus with either. With enough shore-based facilities, they can counter the US Navy. But as soon as there's a shooting war over either, China is the aggressor to international order (Taiwan's sovereignity and maritime law), Chinese international trade evaporates (in terms of both exports and raw material imports), and their economy crashes. So the only Chinese winning move, to me, looks like saber rattling right up to the brink, but making sure it never boils over. Which was always the China-in-the-WTO argument -- addict them to the benefits of international trade, such that offending the global order would mean slitting their own economic throat.