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"please think for a second what liability you would want for any mistakes that you make with your web startup or idea" It seems to me that bitcoin wallets are
by bigiain 15y ago
"please think for a second what liability you would want for any mistakes that you make with your web startup or idea"
It seems to me that bitcoin wallets are a relatively new and not well enough understood risk. There are very few other "files" like them, in that an attacker copying them can deprive you of their value in a way that you cant protect with backups. I feel a big part of current "internet security best practices" are about minimising the risk of getting exploited - but with a pragmatic limit to how much effort you invest mediated by the excuse of "if we _do_ get rooted, we can always reinstall and recover from backups". It'll only cost you time, and perhaps some reputation, and may put assumed-private-to-you information in someone else's hands, but it hasn't deprived you of access to any of your data. That doesn't apply to bitcoin wallets, and example like this are pointing out flaws in assumptions people are making about appropriate ways to manage them.
It'd suck to be "that guy" who provides the object lesson in why we need to think differently about bitcoin wallets to just about any other file type we might put on an internet accessible machine, but we _do_, and I don't know whether we have an answer to the question "Is there a way to secure a bitcoin wallet on a machine someone else has root access to (either your datacenter's staff with physical access, or the people with hypervisor access to the hardware your vm is running on)?"
I _think_ the answer is "if you can't trust those people, you can't risk storing your bitcoins there". There's a reason people keep their money in banks, and not in train station luggage lockers. I'm guessing inexpensive commodity VPS's should be considered closer to storage lockers than bank vaults. I suspect the finance sector and/or fortune500 companies have hosting arrangements with companies offering bank-vault grade protection and reserve bank style insurance - but sure as hell not at $24.95/month.
- etcet 15y agoDon't store your money on servers you don't own. Don't have a web interface. Don't allow anyone to connect. Don't use passwords, use public key encryption. These are the basics.
- tomp 15y agoWhat if they steal the key?
- Tuna-Fish 15y agoAn interesting point is that for receiving coins and for long-term storage, bitcoin wallets do not need to be online, and in fact do not need to ever have touched a machine that has been online. While slush "just" lost his "hot wallet", another user lost 200k. When will it become common best practice to store high-value accounts entirely off computers? You can print out a bitcoin wallet and put it in a safe deposit box for storage, and still add money to it.
- baddox 15y agoI don't see what's so conceptually new about bitcoin wallets. They're just plain text that you don't want people getting access to. It's no different than storing passwords in plain text: if someone copies them, they're completely compromised (until the user changes them). The solution is pretty simple: encrypt your own bitcoins with your own password (or more ideally, your private key). Then, if someone hacks your server, they don't get anything.
- sans-serif 15y agoKeys normally grant access so worst case once they're compromised you can take the server offline physically. Even private signing keys can be revoked though some damage may have been done. With Bitcoin, once it's copied, you can consider it gone forever, irrevocably, in totality.
- repsilat 15y agoI thought the idea was if someone copied your bitcoins it was essentially a race to be the first to spend them. I guess if you're stealing bitcoins, though, you're going to be quick to run them through a couple of transactions to claim ownership of them. (Of course, my understanding might be completely off-base.)
- kamaal 15y agoSorry for asking a noob question. But what really is a bit coin? I mean in physical existence. Is it just a file(plain text) with some data/metadata? And stealing it means copying those files, and then deleting the source? Which in case how is this any different than traditional bank account. My money in the bank is basically DB record. And that can be stolen. The bank can then just say to every one 'look this transaction from db such and such is no longer valid'. Can't bit coin do the same? I guess I'm missing something fundamental. Can somebody explain this?
- coopdog 15y agoA 'bit coin' is a space on a block chain that everyone has a copy of. You lock the coin with a cryptographpic key, which you need to store. Whoever has a copy of the key can unlock the bitcoin and re lock it with a different key, such that now only the new owner has a copy of the key. Everyone can still see the entire block chain, but only one account (that no one knows the owner of) has the ability to move that coin. So they got access to these peoples keys and transferred ownership of the coins. Most money supplies are regulated, but bitcoin isn't regulated. No one has the ability to say 'reverse that transaction', but it also makes the currency safe from inflation and interference by money printing governments and privacy snoops.
- gizzlon 15y ago"Is there a way to secure a bitcoin wallet on a machine someone else has root access to (either your datacenter's staff with physical access, or the people with hypervisor access to the hardware your vm is running on)?" Probably not, _maybe_ trusted computing could help[1]. But it might secure enough if you had a special piece of hardware that stored the bitcoin-key and did all the signing operations. I believe things like these exists for Certifications and other signing-keys. I doubt VeriSign stores their root certificates on just-another-box :) [1] In theory, TC could "anchor" your data to the hardware chip on the motherboard, and breaking it would require physical tampering.
- JoachimSchipper 15y agoYou're thinking of a hardware security module (HSM). These are standard for e.g. certificate authorities. To the best of my knowledge, they have never been used by bitcoin outfits, but that is certainly possible, in principle. Of course, sane people don't mix HSMs and VMs.
- noduerme 15y agoStill, the amount stolen in Bitcoins here is probably small potatoes next to the value of all the credit cards and personal details stored in other Linode instances. If someone can hack their admin panel and get root access to 8 accounts, they can get access to all the accounts. This time it happened to be done by someone who was going after the Bitcoins. But how can they claim anything in the way of security? People who host on a VPS typically do so because they want to run complex applications that scale up, and do so without the cost or headaches of adding more physical hardware. Most people who use Linode probably do not do so to host static webpages, which can be done just fine on a shared server for a quarter the price. While Linode might be cheap, they do claim to be secure, and if they didn't it's doubtful people would host their apps there. And most apps do take some personal information; and a large number of them take financial details. No one would use Linode to host their apps if they thought all accounts were rootable from a master login panel. And no one would use them to host static pages. So who would their customers be if people didn't expect their instances to be secure?