From the perspective that minds are very complex things (which is not a very controversial proposition), it would not be at all surprising to find that human-li

From the perspective that minds are very complex things (which is not a very controversial proposition), it would not be at all surprising to find that human-like minds unavoidably have a high φ. Unless the measure can differentiate between minds and other complex things that score as highly, however, this would not be particularly interesting and it is hard to see how it would get us noticeably closer to understanding minds. Thus, Aaronson's identification of structures capable of arbitrarily high φ, yet not displaying higher-level consciousness (such as being self-aware and having a theory of mind) is indeed a significant problem for IIT. If proponents of IIT object that it is only an assumption that these systems are not conscious, they should be pleased that Aaronson has given them a way to empirically evaluate their thesis!