3 ms·
> Maybe phi's necessary but not sufficient for consciousness; that would still be pretty interesting. Would it be interesting? Why? Coming up with conditions
by bawolff 3y ago
> Maybe phi's necessary but not sufficient for consciousness; that would still be pretty interesting.
Would it be interesting? Why?
Coming up with conditions that are neccesary but not sufficient is pretty easy. Sure they are interesting if the conditions are non-intuitive and you've actually proven they are neccesary. I'm not sure either criteria is met here.
- photonthug 3y agoI mean.. doesn't your logic here advocate throwing away every "lower-bound" type of result in math, suggest that it's boring/trivial to answer the smallest LLM that speaks english ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07759 https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07759 ), etc?
- bawolff 3y agoNo, just that a lower bound in and of itself isn't interesting without further justification as to why. Most non-tight lower bounds are trivial. > suggest that it's boring/trivial to answer the smallest LLM that speaks english ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07759 https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07759 ), etc? That's kind of the opposite question. There's a difference between asking "What is the smallest LLM that can speak english" and "What size must an LLM at least be in order for it to be able to speak english". The former is an interesting question. The latter is trivial as it has an answer of "1". I believe the parent was talking about the latter type of lower bound not the former.
- freehorse 3y agoThat would sort out any current or shortly-foreseeable AI systems as non-conscious (or very-low-consious), though, while in other theories of consciousness it is not clear what would be the case (because others make extremely vague predictions and accept quite contradictory models of them).