> is nonetheless obviously not conscious This argument has played out before so I'll just link to that discussion. quoting from https://www.scottaaronson.com/r

> is nonetheless obviously not conscious This argument has played out before so I'll just link to that discussion. quoting from https://www.scottaaronson.com/response-p1.pdf https://www.scottaaronson.com/response-p1.pdf > There’s two responses to this. The easiest response is to say that φ is merely necessary for C —problem solved. GT’s response would be to challenge your intuition for things being unconscious. Here’s a historical analogy; imagine when the Kelvin temperature scale was introduced. Here Kelvin was saying that just about everything has heat in it. In fact, even the coldest thing you’ve touched actually has substantial heat in it! Think of IIT as attempting to put a Kelvin-scale on our notions of C . I find this “Kelvin scale for C ” analogy makes the panpsychism much more palatable. Then, Scott's response to that: > Suppose, again, that I told you that physicists since Kelvin had gotten the definition of temperature all wrong, and that I had a new, better definition. And, when I built a Scott-thermometer that measures true temperatures, it delivered the shocking result that boiling water is actually colder than ice. You’d probably tell me where to shove my Scott-thermometer. But wait: how do you know that I’m not the Copernicus of heat, and that future generations won’t celebrate my breakthrough while scoffing at your small-mindedness? Ok, pretty dismissive, but this doesn't actually address what the first quote mentions. Maybe phi's necessary but not sufficient for consciousness; that would still be pretty interesting. (I.e. maybe the pesky function does have high phi, but phi is not itself consciousness, because Consciousness(system) = phi(system) + Corrective_factor). Or suppose we add an axiom like "feedback loops that affect future trajectory" to exclude such a pesky static function definition, or better still suppose IIT moves towards something that generally accounts for more subtle dynamics as well as structure. I can't help but think of the relationship between euclidean/noneuclidean geometry here, especially when "obviousness" comes up in these discussions. It seems productive to play with adding/discarding axioms and looking for richness/consistency. And isn't lots of modern physics about exploring model parameter-space ( https://www.quantamagazine.org/using-the-bootstrap-physicists-uncover-geometry-of-theory-space-20170223/ https://www.quantamagazine.org/using-the-bootstrap-physicist... ) to zero in on "the" model given "a" model? Like 1D-Ising won't phase-transition, maybe current 1D-IIT won't cut it but has some fruitful generalization.