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I don't think you need b) to make the argument work. You just need to point out that a) isn't present in physical theories, except as labels or correlations. Th
by goatlover 3y ago
I don't think you need b) to make the argument work. You just need to point out that a) isn't present in physical theories, except as labels or correlations. The zombie argument is b), which is just one of several thought experiments to illustrate the argument being made, but it's not necessary to make the argument work. Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn and Block have all made arguments that don't rely on b).
Nagel states it most clearly in that science is the view from nowhere. The world doesn't feel like, taste like, look like anything on it's own, because those are creature-based sensations which depend on the kind of sensory organs and nervous systems an animal has.
- wzdd 3y agoThe position still seems to boil down to "Reducing experience to labels or correlations doesn't feel right to me", which actually dovetails nicely with your Nagel quote, since you can't rely on your intuition when attempting to understand a system from the inside.
- goatlover 3y agoThe fact that it feels like something at all is enough of a rebuttal to reducing experience to labels or correlations. That's not an intuition, it's just a statement of empirical fact, since empiricism relies on phenomenal observations.
- wzdd 3y agoThe fact that it feels like something at all could simply be a description of what it's like for these correlations to arise inside a complex system. It's not a rebuttal, it's just a restatement of the position.