4 ms·

It sounds like you didn’t read the paper. It’s a reporting system, not an access system. No one can actually be granted access to your photos under Apple’s sche

It sounds like you didn’t read the paper. It’s a reporting system, not an access system. No one can actually be granted access to your photos under Apple’s scheme. One of your photos must be an exact match for photos already existing in the CSAM database, at which point a report is generated, still not with the complete image from your phone. Even if the CSAM database were compromised by the FBI, where is the back door?

JohnFen 3y ago
I did read the paper, and I understand what the system did. I suspect that you just have a more narrow definition of "back door" than I do. > One of your photos must be an exact match for photos already existing in the CSAM database, at which point a report is generated IIRC, one of your photos must match a hash that exists in the database, not an exact match to an image itself. That's the means by which end-to-end encryption is evaded. That evasion is why I call it a back door. Really, my entire problem with the scheme was that it took place on the device itself rather than in the iCloud. While all smartphones are surveillance devices already, making one as overtly a surveillance device like this sets a precedent that I think is exceedingly harmful.
- willseth 3y ago
  You’re missing the key point that there isn’t much surface for misuse under Apples scheme. If the FBI wants to falsely accuse you of having CSAM, inserting a hash from a photo on your phone into the CSAM database is actually much more complicated than simply putting CSAM on your phone. Running the scanner on your device means they actually need to compromise your device.
  - JohnFen 3y ago
    > You’re missing the key point that there isn’t much surface for misuse under Apples scheme. No, I didn't miss that point at all. It's just orthogonal to my objection to the scheme. I object to the idea of formally making highly personal devices like your phone into ones that are spying on you. We have more than enough of that sort of thing informally. To make it official could only make things worse for everybody, Apple users and otherwise. Since the whole thing was about photos being stored in the cloud, it would have been much less objectionable to put the scanning on the cloud side of things. At least that's actually someone else's computer and not someone using your own hardware against you.
    - willseth 3y ago
      Your theoretical objection is divorced from any actual consequences that affect people. Why should anyone care? You state no benefits or harms other than what you feel. My point is about reality, so yes you missed it
      - JohnFen 3y ago
        Hmm. I think the opposite, that you are missing my point entirely. But, really, it's probably just that we fundamentally disagree on very basic issues. That's fair.

JohnFen 3y ago

I did read the paper, and I understand what the system did. I suspect that you just have a more narrow definition of "back door" than I do. > One of your photos must be an exact match for photos already existing in the CSAM database, at which point a report is generated IIRC, one of your photos must match a hash that exists in the database, not an exact match to an image itself. That's the means by which end-to-end encryption is evaded. That evasion is why I call it a back door. Really, my entire problem with the scheme was that it took place on the device itself rather than in the iCloud. While all smartphones are surveillance devices already, making one as overtly a surveillance device like this sets a precedent that I think is exceedingly harmful.

willseth 3y ago
You’re missing the key point that there isn’t much surface for misuse under Apples scheme. If the FBI wants to falsely accuse you of having CSAM, inserting a hash from a photo on your phone into the CSAM database is actually much more complicated than simply putting CSAM on your phone. Running the scanner on your device means they actually need to compromise your device.
- JohnFen 3y ago
  > You’re missing the key point that there isn’t much surface for misuse under Apples scheme. No, I didn't miss that point at all. It's just orthogonal to my objection to the scheme. I object to the idea of formally making highly personal devices like your phone into ones that are spying on you. We have more than enough of that sort of thing informally. To make it official could only make things worse for everybody, Apple users and otherwise. Since the whole thing was about photos being stored in the cloud, it would have been much less objectionable to put the scanning on the cloud side of things. At least that's actually someone else's computer and not someone using your own hardware against you.
  - willseth 3y ago
    Your theoretical objection is divorced from any actual consequences that affect people. Why should anyone care? You state no benefits or harms other than what you feel. My point is about reality, so yes you missed it
    - JohnFen 3y ago
      Hmm. I think the opposite, that you are missing my point entirely. But, really, it's probably just that we fundamentally disagree on very basic issues. That's fair.