> But given that the effects of MCAS misactivation are similar to a trim runaway, which is supposed to be a memory item for 737 pilots, the inescapable takeaway

> But given that the effects of MCAS misactivation are similar to a trim runaway, which is supposed to be a memory item for 737 pilots, the inescapable takeaway is that a lot of pilots simply weren't/aren't prepared to handle rare but critical in-flight emergencies that builders and certification authorities take for granted Similar to runaway trim that pilots were familiar with, but from what I recall from one of the videos where a 737 pilot showed in a simulator what handling it was like and other discussion there was one crucial difference. (I may be misremembering all this though). After the pilots handle runaway trim and have the automatic trim disabled and have manually gotten it back to what it should be, most would try re-enabling it. Most of the time when they would get runaway trim turning the system off and on would fix it. And if that didn't fix it and you got another runaway trim, it was no worse than the previous one. You'd fix it. And if you wanted you could try turning it on again. (From what I've seen on documentaries on other crashes, there are actually a surprising amount of aircraft systems where "reboot it and see if that works" is standard practice for in flight failures). With a malfunctioning MCAS though there was in effect a ratchet. The down trim added by MCAS did not go away when you stopped it and manually restored normal trim. Each time you decided to try it again to see if the prior reboot had fixed it and it hadn't you got a little more down trim bias. Do that a few times and you end up with so much MCAS down trim bias that the maximum up trim you could do was not enough and you are then screwed. The MAX needed a bold addition to the runaway trim emergency procedure along the lines of "After recovering from runaway trim, you MUST leave this system OFF".