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The MAX is the one plane I will absolutely not fly on. It's nice to see the numbers, but as you say, fairly unsurprising. It's also nice to see that the 787 and

The MAX is the one plane I will absolutely not fly on. It's nice to see the numbers, but as you say, fairly unsurprising. It's also nice to see that the 787 and A380 have never crashed, since those are my favorite planes.

wkat4242 3y ago
It's not a bad plane. Every pilot now knows its flaws. Don't forget one flip of a switch would have saved all those lives. The problem was the pilots never knew that switch was even there. I'd fly on it just fine, I wouldn't feel unsafe. Though I'd regret providing profits for the company that deliberately let those people die.
- paulryanrogers 3y ago
  Isn't it more than the MCAS itself but also the reliance on one sensor (redundancy optional expense) instead of standard of three?!
  - wkat4242 3y ago
    Well yes both. But either way, if the pilots had known MCAS existed, all they would have had to do was switch it off. In both cases they had plenty of time to do it. Knowledge is key, even with 3 sensors it's possible 2 of them fail, though much less likely.
    - seabass-labrax 3y ago
      The scandal with the MCAS though was in large part because Boeing went out of their way to hide the existence of this system to save their customers training costs, and therefore win more sales from existing 737 operators. On the contrary, Airbus, for instance, provide detailed guidance for what to do if either one, two or all three of a system like the ADIRS (Air Data Inertial Reference System) were to fail during a flight, even though that is extremely unlikely.
    - sokoloff 3y ago
      ET302’s crew did switch it off [correctly]. They then switched it back on in an attempt to fly the airplane out of the emergency.
- sokoloff 3y ago
  ET302’s crew (the second Max crash) also knew about the plane’s fault mode and almost saved the craft. If they’d have continued to command nose-down manually [after correctly executing the runaway trim disable checklist memory items and then re-enabling the power to the offending system in order to command aircraft-nose-down trim for a short time], they’d have almost surely flown the airplane back to base. It was Boeing’s fault, but the crew almost saved it and inexplicably re-enabled the fault after correcting it. They were so close…
- quickthrower2 3y ago
  How safe is it? You need the MCAS to compensate for the change in aerodynamics. So if the pilots flick the switch off, then the pilots would need to retrain to fly this now non-737 series plane? Have they?

wkat4242 3y ago

It's not a bad plane. Every pilot now knows its flaws. Don't forget one flip of a switch would have saved all those lives. The problem was the pilots never knew that switch was even there. I'd fly on it just fine, I wouldn't feel unsafe. Though I'd regret providing profits for the company that deliberately let those people die.

paulryanrogers 3y ago
Isn't it more than the MCAS itself but also the reliance on one sensor (redundancy optional expense) instead of standard of three?!
- wkat4242 3y ago
  Well yes both. But either way, if the pilots had known MCAS existed, all they would have had to do was switch it off. In both cases they had plenty of time to do it. Knowledge is key, even with 3 sensors it's possible 2 of them fail, though much less likely.
  - seabass-labrax 3y ago
    The scandal with the MCAS though was in large part because Boeing went out of their way to hide the existence of this system to save their customers training costs, and therefore win more sales from existing 737 operators. On the contrary, Airbus, for instance, provide detailed guidance for what to do if either one, two or all three of a system like the ADIRS (Air Data Inertial Reference System) were to fail during a flight, even though that is extremely unlikely.
  - sokoloff 3y ago
    ET302’s crew did switch it off [correctly]. They then switched it back on in an attempt to fly the airplane out of the emergency.
sokoloff 3y ago
ET302’s crew (the second Max crash) also knew about the plane’s fault mode and almost saved the craft. If they’d have continued to command nose-down manually [after correctly executing the runaway trim disable checklist memory items and then re-enabling the power to the offending system in order to command aircraft-nose-down trim for a short time], they’d have almost surely flown the airplane back to base. It was Boeing’s fault, but the crew almost saved it and inexplicably re-enabled the fault after correcting it. They were so close…
quickthrower2 3y ago
How safe is it? You need the MCAS to compensate for the change in aerodynamics. So if the pilots flick the switch off, then the pilots would need to retrain to fly this now non-737 series plane? Have they?