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Integrated Information Theory
- optimalsolver 3y agoResponse from Scott Aaronson: https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799
- photonthug 3y agoother related stuff: https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1823 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1823 https://www.scottaaronson.com/response-p1.pdf https://www.scottaaronson.com/response-p1.pdf https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5pYPdmKMzDLZHe4zx/link-scott-aaronson-on-integrated-information-theory https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5pYPdmKMzDLZHe4zx/link-scott... and probably lots from hacker-news too: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23158502 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23158502 that said i'm still keen to see more/better discussion of IIT, and/or more modern extensions. IIT is certainly quantitative, and arguably elegant, despite problems. so it puzzles me how eager some people are to just junk it rather than repairing it.
- mrtranscendence 3y agoI rarely see IIT characterized as complete junk. Personally, I don't see much value in it as I don't think it answers, or even grapples with, the hard problem of consciousness. Tell me how integrated information gives rise to subjective experience and maybe I'll start buying what they're selling.
- rvcdbn 3y agoYou could ask the same kind of question about General Relativity. Sure mass/energy causes the curvature of spacetime but tell me how it does or your theory is worthless. Even without the “how” GR still makes testable predictions that are born out by experiment. And this is the shape of all our physical theories. I think this is the kind of theory IIT is trying to be.
- mrtranscendence 3y agoWell, there's a reason it's called "the hard problem of consciousness" and not "just some incidental observation about models of consciousness". When evaluating general relativity it's not important to ask how mass/energy causes the curvature of spacetime; that's not the point of general relativity. But a theory of consciousness that doesn't explain the most intriguing, important component of consciousness doesn't explain what's important to me.
- photonthug 3y agoI think what they are selling is not answers, but more like a non-metaphysical platform to propose answers within, i.e. a decent start at a scientific framework. Frameworks shouldn't be confused with answers, although they might represent some way of getting closer to answers. Besides IIT, is there an alternative scientific/quantified framework that could even try to grapple with your question? For purposes of comparison, here's another approach that's super interesting ( https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4168033/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4168033/ ). So both frameworks are looking at system structure/dynamics and then attempting to deduce/quantify some aspect of them that (hopefully) gives us some insight into "Mind" or "Consciousness". But to me, grounding such inquiries directly in neuroscience seems awkward, because brain only runs Mind. Uncovering a bunch of implementation details about that from FMRIs probably won't give us a lot of interesting insight at the right level. To an extent some implementation details are important and might shed light on the architecture/algorithm of Consciousness/Mind, but evolved systems are also going to be cluttered up with total hacks that evolution brute-forced where implementation is kinda arbitrary. All of which is to say, IIT being "platform agnostic" and proposing stuff like a thermostat is more conscious than a rock, a dog moreso than a thermostat, and a human more than a dog is not just a cool trick. Being able to approach this kind of intuitive problem in a somewhat rigorous way seems like a necessary requirement for a serious scientific theory of mind. I like the Ising and graph theory modeling approach, but the implementation details of {neuron-counting, FMRI, lesions on functional areas, etc} is probably a distraction if you're trying to understand mind rather than medicine.
- wzdd 3y agoThis issue with Aaronson's response is that it comes from the perspective of first accepting Chalmers' "Hard Problem of consciousness". The "Hard Problem of consciousness", despite the name, is actually a statement of position. Briefly, it states that: a) We have experiences, like being hungry, tasting a strawberry, seeing blue, etc. b) It's possible to imagine a being which located food when hungry, ate when necessary, used colours to navigate the world, etc, but did not have these conscious experiences. To put it another way, what we've learnt so far about how the brain works gives us great insight into how we would eat, navigate, etc, but does not give us any insight into either how or why we would have conscious experiences. c) Therefore conscious experiences are not explicable by physical brain processes. This is a belief arising from an appeal to intuition and does not present a testable or falsifiable proposition. Integrated Information Theory (which I am not a vigorous proponent of) posits that the experience of consciousness is related to the level of "integration" of a system. However, if you come to this while believing in the "Hard Problem", that cannot possibly be true, because IIT relates consciousness to physical properties of the system such as connectivity, but the "Hard Problem" defines consciousness as something which does not arise from any physical property of the system.
- goatlover 3y agoI don't think you need b) to make the argument work. You just need to point out that a) isn't present in physical theories, except as labels or correlations. The zombie argument is b), which is just one of several thought experiments to illustrate the argument being made, but it's not necessary to make the argument work. Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn and Block have all made arguments that don't rely on b). Nagel states it most clearly in that science is the view from nowhere. The world doesn't feel like, taste like, look like anything on it's own, because those are creature-based sensations which depend on the kind of sensory organs and nervous systems an animal has.
- wzdd 3y agoThe position still seems to boil down to "Reducing experience to labels or correlations doesn't feel right to me", which actually dovetails nicely with your Nagel quote, since you can't rely on your intuition when attempting to understand a system from the inside.
- Der_Einzige 3y agoFor similarly silly ideas: see these articles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_realism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_realism
- DontchaKnowit 3y agoI cant even find anything resembling an explanation if what "speculative realism" posits in that wiki article. What is it and why is it silly?
- Der_Einzige 3y ago"Thus, all object relations, human and nonhuman, are said to exist on an equal ontological footing with one another" They are ideas from people who don't like Anthropocenterism, which Integrated Information Theory is also opposed to. It's worth noting that all of the people who believe in any of this are philosophical wingcucks like Nick Land.
- WFHRenaissance 3y agoLOL Chill with the Land hate.
- Der_Einzige 3y agoHe's openly fascist and a charlatan. I shouldn't be surprised that people here like him. Also no surprise that people influenced by him, i.e. Mark Fischer, killed themselves.
- DontchaKnowit 3y agookay I must say - I just read his wikipedia and I read a line saying he was explicitly racist - skimmed all the sources and there was 0 evidence of racism. Then i read his article : Hyper-Racism. It is not racist, as far as I can tell. Can you hook me up with something damning about him? cause to me, he just seems like a mega autistic edge-lord philosopher that has some fairly prescient views about what the future is going to look like. (and Steve Bannon happens to like him, so people call him racist) EDIT : sorry misread your comment - you said fascist, not racist. Anyway I am going to keep my above comment cause I'm interested
- cpsempek 3y agoHow does déja vu, that is the re-experiencing an experience, fit into this theory? It appears that the Information axioms fails to be Essential when one considers déja vu.
- n4r9 3y agoI don't see that deja vu poses a problem. Deja vu is simply a feeling of familiarity associated to an experience. It doesn't involve actually having an experience more than once.
- cpsempek 3y agoPossibly - but I could just claim that for me déja vu is exactly when two experiences are not differentiable from one another. And if someone claims to have experienced this moment before, identically, how would I refute their claim. It's their experience after all.
- n4r9 3y agoWhen I experience deja vu, I can never place the time or location that I actually had a previous similar experience. Nor can I predict in advance any occurrence, despite it seeming so inevitable when it does occur. It is simply a dreamlike quality of familiarity. Having done some reading about it, this seems to be the typical state of affairs. Given this, the simplest and most compelling explanation is that the brain has somehow short-circuited itself into invoking a sense of familiarity. Otherwise I'd expect, at least some people, some of the time, to be able to either link the two experiences or make predictions. The claim that exactly the same experience has actually occurred twice is the more remarkable, both in terms of evidence and plausible mechanism. Whilst I do appreciate that experiences are highly subjective beasts, it doesn't feel like this really challenges the linked article. Besides, if one is so wedded to the subjectivity of experience, they might as well just say that nothing can objectively explain consciousness because it's subjective, end of.
- transfer92 3y agoI'm either not smart enough to understand it, or I'm too smart to be bamboozled by it. (Physics A.B. from Harvard & PhD. from UC Berkeley, FWIW)
- akhayam 3y agoFrom someone who has dabbled in information theory (the real one), I am just as confused as you. What I have observed in the past decade is that calling things “information theory of something” makes it somehow more palatable for a broader audience.
- feoren 3y agoI was nodding along to everything until they got to the 4th and 5th axioms: > Integration: ... seeing a blue book is irreducible to seeing a book without the color blue, plus the color blue without the book What? Why is this taken as a given? This is not at all evident. You could show someone a blue book and then ask them to imagine that same book, but with a red cover instead, and many people would feel perfectly comfortable doing this, having some experience close to actually seeing that red book. If that doesn't straight-up prove this axiom wrong (I personally think it does), then it at least shows that this axiom is not clearly "evident". > Exclusion: my experience flows at a particular speed—each experience encompassing say a hundred milliseconds or so Have these people never been bored? Have they never heard of how "time slows down" during a car crash? This is not only non-evident, it's another one that seem patently false if you actually talk to any human beings about their own experiences.