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What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me. In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, ha
by sunaurus 3y ago
What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me.
In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement.
There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
- lores 3y agoI'm saying replacing a neuron or cell at a time within a quadrillion of them empirically leads to continued consciousness, and that assembling a quadrillion cells on a remote planet with no material connection whatsoever with the original body is a very different thing. You want to hide both cases behind the same word. I don't see why you think that's valid.