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> Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your ori

> Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your original body. How do you reach this conclusion? The only conclusion I can reach is that an identical consciousness is certainly in both bodies. (And as soon as both bodies are making new memories, you have a "fork", where the two persons stop being identical)

lores 3y ago
How would that work? Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes, think with both brains? How would the ineffable quality that makes you feel like you are you get transported to Mars? I don't think that's a tenable possibility.
- sunaurus 3y ago
  There is no single "you" in this scenario, there are two distinct persons. One experiences being transported to Mars, the other experiences the transporter failing and them being stuck on Earth.
  - lores 3y ago
    I think we're talking at cross purposes. Me, the body I inhabit, is still on Earth. The person on Mars, who likely also has a consciousness, and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me, but someone else, because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
    - sunaurus 3y ago
      That brings me back to my original question: > What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
      - lores 3y ago
        So, the slow replacement preserves consciousness. Why, who knows, but it happens to us already every day, so we can take it as granted. If it didn't, we'd be someone different every day, with false memories, and while it's not impossible there's not really many places reason can take us from there. The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference. Is that clearer?
        sunaurus 3y ago
        What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me. In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement. There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
        lores 3y ago
        I'm saying replacing a neuron or cell at a time within a quadrillion of them empirically leads to continued consciousness, and that assembling a quadrillion cells on a remote planet with no material connection whatsoever with the original body is a very different thing. You want to hide both cases behind the same word. I don't see why you think that's valid.
    - Ukv 3y ago
      > and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me If both are identical I don't see why both aren't equally me. > because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. Why must there be a single continuation of "me"? I wouldn't necessarily consider this true even under current medical technology - we can split the brain in two and have two parts that do not directly communicate. What if the process is symmetrical (one body in, some kind of mitosis occurs, two bodies out at equal distance)? Does one get assigned "the real me" at random? If both have the same memories/personality/train-of-thought and experience the process as continuous, why not both?
      - lores 3y ago
        But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there. We are taking about a machine that assembles atoms on a remote planet. None of the atoms come from your current body. What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone?
        Ukv 3y ago
        > But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there I'm probing to get a better understanding of your belief system. How does it hold up under symmetrical cloning? > What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone? I'll label: * PM: Physiological "me" - personality, memories, train of thought, currently instantiated as a brain * IM: "Immaterial" "me" - a "soul", impacted by the PM. May impact the PM or just be an observer (depending on variant of dualism) From what I understand, you believe there's an IM controlling a PM, and the IM is a different kind of stuff that would not be cloned. The IM generally follows the same PM, but could be "shaken off" from too-large changes. On cloning of PM you think this happens (at the instant of cloning): IM New soul | | PM PM You ask "Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes" because you thought sunaurus is proposing this happens: IM / \ PM PM Whereas I (and I think sunaurus) don't believe in an IM. We think two identical PMs really are identical persons, including whatever we'd call consciousness: PM PM Others may believe that IMs do exist but supervene on the PM (so identical PM has identical IM arising from it): IM IM | | PM PM
    - Jack000 3y ago
      This conflict only exists if you believe in a single, inviolable self. Which cell is the “real” one when it divides? Which branch of a tree is the true tree? Both versions of you have equal claim to the past, as long as the copy is truly identical.

lores 3y ago

How would that work? Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes, think with both brains? How would the ineffable quality that makes you feel like you are you get transported to Mars? I don't think that's a tenable possibility.

sunaurus 3y ago
There is no single "you" in this scenario, there are two distinct persons. One experiences being transported to Mars, the other experiences the transporter failing and them being stuck on Earth.
- lores 3y ago
  I think we're talking at cross purposes. Me, the body I inhabit, is still on Earth. The person on Mars, who likely also has a consciousness, and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me, but someone else, because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
  - sunaurus 3y ago
    That brings me back to my original question: > What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
    - lores 3y ago
      So, the slow replacement preserves consciousness. Why, who knows, but it happens to us already every day, so we can take it as granted. If it didn't, we'd be someone different every day, with false memories, and while it's not impossible there's not really many places reason can take us from there. The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference. Is that clearer?
      - sunaurus 3y ago
        What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me. In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement. There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
        lores 3y ago
        I'm saying replacing a neuron or cell at a time within a quadrillion of them empirically leads to continued consciousness, and that assembling a quadrillion cells on a remote planet with no material connection whatsoever with the original body is a very different thing. You want to hide both cases behind the same word. I don't see why you think that's valid.
  - Ukv 3y ago
    > and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me If both are identical I don't see why both aren't equally me. > because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. Why must there be a single continuation of "me"? I wouldn't necessarily consider this true even under current medical technology - we can split the brain in two and have two parts that do not directly communicate. What if the process is symmetrical (one body in, some kind of mitosis occurs, two bodies out at equal distance)? Does one get assigned "the real me" at random? If both have the same memories/personality/train-of-thought and experience the process as continuous, why not both?
    - lores 3y ago
      But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there. We are taking about a machine that assembles atoms on a remote planet. None of the atoms come from your current body. What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone?
      - Ukv 3y ago
        > But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there I'm probing to get a better understanding of your belief system. How does it hold up under symmetrical cloning? > What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone? I'll label: * PM: Physiological "me" - personality, memories, train of thought, currently instantiated as a brain * IM: "Immaterial" "me" - a "soul", impacted by the PM. May impact the PM or just be an observer (depending on variant of dualism) From what I understand, you believe there's an IM controlling a PM, and the IM is a different kind of stuff that would not be cloned. The IM generally follows the same PM, but could be "shaken off" from too-large changes. On cloning of PM you think this happens (at the instant of cloning): IM New soul | | PM PM You ask "Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes" because you thought sunaurus is proposing this happens: IM / \ PM PM Whereas I (and I think sunaurus) don't believe in an IM. We think two identical PMs really are identical persons, including whatever we'd call consciousness: PM PM Others may believe that IMs do exist but supervene on the PM (so identical PM has identical IM arising from it): IM IM | | PM PM
  - Jack000 3y ago
    This conflict only exists if you believe in a single, inviolable self. Which cell is the “real” one when it divides? Which branch of a tree is the true tree? Both versions of you have equal claim to the past, as long as the copy is truly identical.