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Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your origi

by lores 3y ago

Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your original body. Now the doc is replacing parts of your brain with silicon. It's posited that it makes no difference to your mind. Because of that, is your consciousness still in your body? Very probably. So I'm not following their logic.

sunaurus 3y ago
> Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your original body. How do you reach this conclusion? The only conclusion I can reach is that an identical consciousness is certainly in both bodies. (And as soon as both bodies are making new memories, you have a "fork", where the two persons stop being identical)
- lores 3y ago
  How would that work? Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes, think with both brains? How would the ineffable quality that makes you feel like you are you get transported to Mars? I don't think that's a tenable possibility.
  - sunaurus 3y ago
    There is no single "you" in this scenario, there are two distinct persons. One experiences being transported to Mars, the other experiences the transporter failing and them being stuck on Earth.
    - lores 3y ago
      I think we're talking at cross purposes. Me, the body I inhabit, is still on Earth. The person on Mars, who likely also has a consciousness, and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me, but someone else, because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
      - sunaurus 3y ago
        That brings me back to my original question: > What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
        lores 3y ago
        So, the slow replacement preserves consciousness. Why, who knows, but it happens to us already every day, so we can take it as granted. If it didn't, we'd be someone different every day, with false memories, and while it's not impossible there's not really many places reason can take us from there. The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference. Is that clearer?
        sunaurus 3y ago
        What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me. In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement. There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
        lores 3y ago
aflag 3y ago
I think it comes down to how that replacement happens. If you keep adding new chips or whatever it is as your old cells die or get altered by the virus, that's one thing. However, if you download your conscience to silicon and have that replace your brain, that's entirely different. I'm unsure which one it was in that question.
zonkerdonker 3y ago
Everyone in this comment section needs to read Greg Egan's Permutation City.

by lores 3y ago

sunaurus 3y ago

> Imagine the "destroy the original" part of the teleportation fails. Is your consciousness still in your original body or on Mars? Certainly, still in your original body. How do you reach this conclusion? The only conclusion I can reach is that an identical consciousness is certainly in both bodies. (And as soon as both bodies are making new memories, you have a "fork", where the two persons stop being identical)

lores 3y ago
How would that work? Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes, think with both brains? How would the ineffable quality that makes you feel like you are you get transported to Mars? I don't think that's a tenable possibility.
- sunaurus 3y ago
  There is no single "you" in this scenario, there are two distinct persons. One experiences being transported to Mars, the other experiences the transporter failing and them being stuck on Earth.
  - lores 3y ago
    I think we're talking at cross purposes. Me, the body I inhabit, is still on Earth. The person on Mars, who likely also has a consciousness, and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me, but someone else, because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies. So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
    - sunaurus 3y ago
      That brings me back to my original question: > What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
      - lores 3y ago
        So, the slow replacement preserves consciousness. Why, who knows, but it happens to us already every day, so we can take it as granted. If it didn't, we'd be someone different every day, with false memories, and while it's not impossible there's not really many places reason can take us from there. The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference. Is that clearer?
        sunaurus 3y ago
        What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me. In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement. There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
        lores 3y ago

aflag 3y ago

I think it comes down to how that replacement happens. If you keep adding new chips or whatever it is as your old cells die or get altered by the virus, that's one thing. However, if you download your conscience to silicon and have that replace your brain, that's entirely different. I'm unsure which one it was in that question.

zonkerdonker 3y ago

Everyone in this comment section needs to read Greg Egan's Permutation City.