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The game told me I was a psychological reductionist, for whom only psychological continuity is important. Fair enough, but it then berated me for taking the spa

by lores 3y ago

The game told me I was a psychological reductionist, for whom only psychological continuity is important. Fair enough, but it then berated me for taking the spaceship rather than the teleporter. Um, what? Whatever appears at the other end of the teleporter is not me, I'm dead and my consciousness extinct, so why the tut-tuting?

behrlich 3y ago
I took Space Ship + silicon rather than virus. I thought the tut-tutting was pretty well explained: > But there is a tension. In allowing your brain and body to be replaced by synthetic parts, you seemed to be accepting that psychological continuity is what matters, not bodily continuity. But if this is the case, why did you risk the spacecraft instead of taking the teletransporter? You ended up allowing your body to be replaced anyway, so why did you decide to risk everything on the spacecraft instead of just giving up your original body there and then? The question being posed is "what is the difference between replacing all of your cells, vs all of your neurons over time?". My logic was that my molecules are being replaced over time, so is that so different than my neurons being replaced over time, whereas a wholesale replacement of my body felt like a break in continuity. I'm no philosopher though :)
- hiccuphippo 3y ago
  This is a thought experiment know as the Ship of Theseus[0]. I never thought of it in terms of replacing molecules in a human body, it certainly spices things up. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
- darepublic 3y ago
  Yes it is like the difference between rolling a wheel from point a to b and picking it up and carrying it over. Life is the rolling. Once the rubber leaves the road it's rip.
sweetsocks21 3y ago
If you do take the teleporter it mentions that as well: > Your three choices show that this is what you see as central to your sense of self, not any attachment to a particular substance, be it your body, brain or soul. However, some would say that you have not survived at all, but fallen foul of a terrible error. In the teletransporter case, for example, was it really you that travelled to Mars or is it more correct to say that a clone or copy of you was made on Mars, while you were destroyed?
dforrestwilson 3y ago
Same. Is there not a reductionism for memories, which is what I believe at least partially defines who I am and probably greatly impacts my choices?
- Ukv 3y ago
  Under "memory reductionism" as you describe, wouldn't the correct choice be to take the teleporter that preserves memories?
sunaurus 3y ago
What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? In both cases, an older version of you is "extinct", meanwhile, the latest version of you does not have any recollection of becoming extinct.
- vichu 3y ago
  I viewed those questions as a play on the Ship of Theseus. If the ship is completely destroyed and a perfect replica rebuilt elsewhere, is it the same ship? Almost certainly not. If the ship is slowly replaced over time, is it the same ship? As a matter of form or psychological continuity as posited in the question, almost certainly.
  - sunaurus 3y ago
    Why do you think those two questions have different answers? For me, the only logical option is that both questions must have the same answer (regardless of what your answer is).
    - vichu 3y ago
      I don't follow your logic. How would constructing a new ship from new materials ever count as being the same as the original ship? At least in the Ship of Theseus paradox, there is the case where you take the old replaced parts and construct a ship from those parts - which is an interesting question, is it the original ship? In this case, the only thing consistent about the ship is the design. Take mass manufactured goods then - are they the same article because the have the same materials?
      - sunaurus 3y ago
        > How would constructing a new ship from new materials ever count as being the same as the original ship? If it's a perfect replica (as you said in your original comment) then by what parameters is it different from the original ship? Sure, cooordinates might be different, but cooridnates can change. If the exact replica switches places with the original, then even that difference would disappear. By the way, I am strictly speaking about this topic in the context of the thread we are in. If a replica is built according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original (and assuming no mistakes are made), then why would the result be any different than just replacing one part on the original with an replica part made according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original part?
13415 3y ago
Exactly the same for me, this is incorrect, though not for the reason you point out. The person at the other side of the teleporter is you. One copy of myself dies whereas another copy of myself lives. Both copies are identical, so both of them are me. So in my opinion this should count as a half death. Otherwise, if the argument was that the destroyed copy doesn't count because I can "feel no continuity", then any quick and sudden death wouldn't count as a death. That would be absurd. If, on the other hand, you believe the teleporter makes a copy of yourself that isn't you, then you're simply not a genuine psychological reductionist. In my opinion, it makes sense to avoid a 1/2 death by taking a 1/2 chance of staying 100% alive. If it doesn't bother you to die at the teleporter, then any sudden, quick death shouldn't bother you either, which goes against the explicit instruction to ensure survival. This is also true in general without the instruction. If a perfect copy was made of someone, it would be rational for both copies to desire to survive.
- lores 3y ago
  I'm not following. Let's assume the teleporter fails and the original is not destroyed, leading to a clone of you on Mars. What then? Who are you?
fasterik 3y ago
>Whatever appears at the other end of the teleporter is not me, I'm dead and my consciousness extinct, so why the tut-tuting? If you think you died when you entered the teletransporter, then you either think bodily continuity or an immaterial soul is relevant. All that matters for psychological continuity is that the person has the same memories, personality, etc. as you.
- hotpotamus 3y ago
  This isn't my first rodeo down this particular philosophical culdesac, but what I've always wondered is - why do you have to destroy the source person in the teleporter? If you don't, then there's still an exact replica of you at the destination. What if the copy comes back to Earth via spaceship and shoots you? The end result is the same, but it sure looks like you're dead.
  - fasterik 3y ago
    If you don't destroy the original body, then both copies have an equal claim to being "you" right after the teleportation, since both are psychologically continuous with the person who existed moments before. Over time, they will have different experiences and different memories and gradually become different people. >What if the copy comes back to Earth via spaceship and shoots you? The end result is the same, but it sure looks like you're dead. The end result is very different because the memories of the surviving copy will be very different. He will remember killing a copy of himself, which by that point is more like a close family member than an identical self.
    - hotpotamus 3y ago
      > If you don't destroy the original body, then both copies have an equal claim to being "you" right after the teleportation This doesn't seem like a good enough reason to kill one of you?
      - fasterik 3y ago
        Not sure what you mean. Do you mean would it be ethical to kill one of them? In my opinion, once two people exist, it would be unethical to kill either of them.
Barrin92 3y ago
>so why the tut-tuting? because you've suddenly switched to a sort of dualism. If you are a psychological reductionist (from some of your other choices, like say using the artificial brain parts), then you assume that minds are what brains do. There is no consciousness separate from your brain, your brain produces your consciousness. So all that matters for you to be alive is for some brain to be around that produces the same mental states you have. There could even be multiple of you! But if you hop on the spaceship you threaten that continuity for the sake of your body. In that case you treat your consciousness as distinct from your body and are afraid of 'losing' it or not being able to transfer it should that particular body die. So you don't just care about your psychological state any more, you think your particular body 'carries' your mind around. That's a contradiction.
sulam 3y ago
I took the same path and got the same tut-tutting. The clear issue is being uncomfortable with immediate replacement vs incremental. I agree it’s illogical, but I’m okay with being illogical on this very hypothetical question. For me, personally, it comes down to the risk of copies. While both scenarios make copies possible it seems less likely in the case where you’re simply replacing parts of my brain. I cannot imagine copies not being made in the teletransportation scenario.
- scruple 3y ago
  I also took the same path, got the tut-tuting. It seems to me that it's only illogical in retrospect. I don't know that there's body and brain eating viruses ravaging Mars, or that souls have to be frozen to die, and I have to make a choice about this, or what any of that means. I make that decision with only the knowledge that I have to take a ticket to Mars and that my goal, throughout, is to "stay alive."
raldi 3y ago
If you were an AI on a computer, and you had a choice of either being copied to a fresh computer with 100% reliability, or having your computer packed up and shipped with a 50% chance of being destroying in transit, which would you pick?
blargey 3y ago
That’s because the author’s concept of “psychological continuity” is looser - “your mind’s rough configuration exists somewhere in the universe some time in the future“, which is different from how you and I define it. Perhaps the ”strict psychological continuity” could be called “psychological+spatiotemporal continuity”, but apparently the author considers the spatiotemporal part to be a component of “strict bodily continuity” and nothing else. If you value temporal continuity independently of bodily continuity, the third question becomes a choice between “dead and soul-destroyed” or “dead but reincarnated”, which is clearly not the author’s intent.

by lores 3y ago

behrlich 3y ago

I took Space Ship + silicon rather than virus. I thought the tut-tutting was pretty well explained: > But there is a tension. In allowing your brain and body to be replaced by synthetic parts, you seemed to be accepting that psychological continuity is what matters, not bodily continuity. But if this is the case, why did you risk the spacecraft instead of taking the teletransporter? You ended up allowing your body to be replaced anyway, so why did you decide to risk everything on the spacecraft instead of just giving up your original body there and then? The question being posed is "what is the difference between replacing all of your cells, vs all of your neurons over time?". My logic was that my molecules are being replaced over time, so is that so different than my neurons being replaced over time, whereas a wholesale replacement of my body felt like a break in continuity. I'm no philosopher though :)

hiccuphippo 3y ago
This is a thought experiment know as the Ship of Theseus[0]. I never thought of it in terms of replacing molecules in a human body, it certainly spices things up. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
darepublic 3y ago
Yes it is like the difference between rolling a wheel from point a to b and picking it up and carrying it over. Life is the rolling. Once the rubber leaves the road it's rip.

sweetsocks21 3y ago

If you do take the teleporter it mentions that as well: > Your three choices show that this is what you see as central to your sense of self, not any attachment to a particular substance, be it your body, brain or soul. However, some would say that you have not survived at all, but fallen foul of a terrible error. In the teletransporter case, for example, was it really you that travelled to Mars or is it more correct to say that a clone or copy of you was made on Mars, while you were destroyed?

dforrestwilson 3y ago

Same. Is there not a reductionism for memories, which is what I believe at least partially defines who I am and probably greatly impacts my choices?

Ukv 3y ago
Under "memory reductionism" as you describe, wouldn't the correct choice be to take the teleporter that preserves memories?

sunaurus 3y ago

What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter? In both cases, an older version of you is "extinct", meanwhile, the latest version of you does not have any recollection of becoming extinct.

vichu 3y ago
I viewed those questions as a play on the Ship of Theseus. If the ship is completely destroyed and a perfect replica rebuilt elsewhere, is it the same ship? Almost certainly not. If the ship is slowly replaced over time, is it the same ship? As a matter of form or psychological continuity as posited in the question, almost certainly.
- sunaurus 3y ago
  Why do you think those two questions have different answers? For me, the only logical option is that both questions must have the same answer (regardless of what your answer is).
  - vichu 3y ago
    I don't follow your logic. How would constructing a new ship from new materials ever count as being the same as the original ship? At least in the Ship of Theseus paradox, there is the case where you take the old replaced parts and construct a ship from those parts - which is an interesting question, is it the original ship? In this case, the only thing consistent about the ship is the design. Take mass manufactured goods then - are they the same article because the have the same materials?
    - sunaurus 3y ago
      > How would constructing a new ship from new materials ever count as being the same as the original ship? If it's a perfect replica (as you said in your original comment) then by what parameters is it different from the original ship? Sure, cooordinates might be different, but cooridnates can change. If the exact replica switches places with the original, then even that difference would disappear. By the way, I am strictly speaking about this topic in the context of the thread we are in. If a replica is built according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original (and assuming no mistakes are made), then why would the result be any different than just replacing one part on the original with an replica part made according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original part?

13415 3y ago

Exactly the same for me, this is incorrect, though not for the reason you point out. The person at the other side of the teleporter is you. One copy of myself dies whereas another copy of myself lives. Both copies are identical, so both of them are me. So in my opinion this should count as a half death. Otherwise, if the argument was that the destroyed copy doesn't count because I can "feel no continuity", then any quick and sudden death wouldn't count as a death. That would be absurd. If, on the other hand, you believe the teleporter makes a copy of yourself that isn't you, then you're simply not a genuine psychological reductionist. In my opinion, it makes sense to avoid a 1/2 death by taking a 1/2 chance of staying 100% alive. If it doesn't bother you to die at the teleporter, then any sudden, quick death shouldn't bother you either, which goes against the explicit instruction to ensure survival. This is also true in general without the instruction. If a perfect copy was made of someone, it would be rational for both copies to desire to survive.

lores 3y ago
I'm not following. Let's assume the teleporter fails and the original is not destroyed, leading to a clone of you on Mars. What then? Who are you?

fasterik 3y ago

>Whatever appears at the other end of the teleporter is not me, I'm dead and my consciousness extinct, so why the tut-tuting? If you think you died when you entered the teletransporter, then you either think bodily continuity or an immaterial soul is relevant. All that matters for psychological continuity is that the person has the same memories, personality, etc. as you.

hotpotamus 3y ago
This isn't my first rodeo down this particular philosophical culdesac, but what I've always wondered is - why do you have to destroy the source person in the teleporter? If you don't, then there's still an exact replica of you at the destination. What if the copy comes back to Earth via spaceship and shoots you? The end result is the same, but it sure looks like you're dead.
- fasterik 3y ago
  If you don't destroy the original body, then both copies have an equal claim to being "you" right after the teleportation, since both are psychologically continuous with the person who existed moments before. Over time, they will have different experiences and different memories and gradually become different people. >What if the copy comes back to Earth via spaceship and shoots you? The end result is the same, but it sure looks like you're dead. The end result is very different because the memories of the surviving copy will be very different. He will remember killing a copy of himself, which by that point is more like a close family member than an identical self.
  - hotpotamus 3y ago
    > If you don't destroy the original body, then both copies have an equal claim to being "you" right after the teleportation This doesn't seem like a good enough reason to kill one of you?
    - fasterik 3y ago
      Not sure what you mean. Do you mean would it be ethical to kill one of them? In my opinion, once two people exist, it would be unethical to kill either of them.

Barrin92 3y ago

>so why the tut-tuting? because you've suddenly switched to a sort of dualism. If you are a psychological reductionist (from some of your other choices, like say using the artificial brain parts), then you assume that minds are what brains do. There is no consciousness separate from your brain, your brain produces your consciousness. So all that matters for you to be alive is for some brain to be around that produces the same mental states you have. There could even be multiple of you! But if you hop on the spaceship you threaten that continuity for the sake of your body. In that case you treat your consciousness as distinct from your body and are afraid of 'losing' it or not being able to transfer it should that particular body die. So you don't just care about your psychological state any more, you think your particular body 'carries' your mind around. That's a contradiction.

sulam 3y ago

I took the same path and got the same tut-tutting. The clear issue is being uncomfortable with immediate replacement vs incremental. I agree it’s illogical, but I’m okay with being illogical on this very hypothetical question. For me, personally, it comes down to the risk of copies. While both scenarios make copies possible it seems less likely in the case where you’re simply replacing parts of my brain. I cannot imagine copies not being made in the teletransportation scenario.

scruple 3y ago
I also took the same path, got the tut-tuting. It seems to me that it's only illogical in retrospect. I don't know that there's body and brain eating viruses ravaging Mars, or that souls have to be frozen to die, and I have to make a choice about this, or what any of that means. I make that decision with only the knowledge that I have to take a ticket to Mars and that my goal, throughout, is to "stay alive."

raldi 3y ago

If you were an AI on a computer, and you had a choice of either being copied to a fresh computer with 100% reliability, or having your computer packed up and shipped with a 50% chance of being destroying in transit, which would you pick?

blargey 3y ago

That’s because the author’s concept of “psychological continuity” is looser - “your mind’s rough configuration exists somewhere in the universe some time in the future“, which is different from how you and I define it. Perhaps the ”strict psychological continuity” could be called “psychological+spatiotemporal continuity”, but apparently the author considers the spatiotemporal part to be a component of “strict bodily continuity” and nothing else. If you value temporal continuity independently of bodily continuity, the third question becomes a choice between “dead and soul-destroyed” or “dead but reincarnated”, which is clearly not the author’s intent.