4 ms·

Seems the crux is in the auto-updating, right? So now we have security people telling us to always run the latest updates, to protect against 0-days, and securi

Seems the crux is in the auto-updating, right? So now we have security people telling us to always run the latest updates, to protect against 0-days, and security people telling us to not update, because that lets the service spy on us. It does not seem to me that there is any middle ground, barring writing your own client, from scratch, against an open protocol. EDIT: seems to me that web-based e2e encryption, as described here, still protects you from irresponsible employees of the service reading your messages. And database leaks etc. Getting an update that spies on customers shipped is not a trivial thing in most organisations.

emersion 3y ago
Updating is fine as long as it's from a auditable repository with full source code history, and built by a third-party like a distro (or the build is reproducible).
- goodpoint 3y ago
  A repository with history is not enough. It's easy to circumvent. You need software packages reviewed and signed by trusted parties - aka a traditional Linux distro.
- skrebbel 3y ago
  Who really reads the source code though?
  - msla 3y ago
    The idea is that enough people do that if something bad happens, it makes the news, by which I mean Twitter/Mastodon/HN/LWN and so on.
    - EGreg 3y ago
      By which time we get this: https://qbix.com/blog https://qbix.com/blog
kpdemetriou 3y ago
The impact of E2EE in the event of database compromises is a little under-rated because the conversation often centers around the maximalist targeted survaillenace threat model. Yet, many more individuals will be affected as a result of plain old data breaches.
NoZebra120vClip 3y ago
> always run the latest updates, to protect against 0-days How does running the latest updates protect against 0-days? Wouldn't the latest updates be bundling the latest 0-days? The latest updates mitigate known vulnerabilities, not 0-days.

emersion 3y ago

Updating is fine as long as it's from a auditable repository with full source code history, and built by a third-party like a distro (or the build is reproducible).

goodpoint 3y ago
A repository with history is not enough. It's easy to circumvent. You need software packages reviewed and signed by trusted parties - aka a traditional Linux distro.
skrebbel 3y ago
Who really reads the source code though?
- msla 3y ago
  The idea is that enough people do that if something bad happens, it makes the news, by which I mean Twitter/Mastodon/HN/LWN and so on.
  - EGreg 3y ago
    By which time we get this: https://qbix.com/blog https://qbix.com/blog

kpdemetriou 3y ago

The impact of E2EE in the event of database compromises is a little under-rated because the conversation often centers around the maximalist targeted survaillenace threat model. Yet, many more individuals will be affected as a result of plain old data breaches.

NoZebra120vClip 3y ago

> always run the latest updates, to protect against 0-days How does running the latest updates protect against 0-days? Wouldn't the latest updates be bundling the latest 0-days? The latest updates mitigate known vulnerabilities, not 0-days.