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> But ignoring "better" because it's not "perfect" is rarely a good strategy. But "better" it is not. When the attacker controls the CA and your OS there is no
by hulitu 3y ago
> But ignoring "better" because it's not "perfect" is rarely a good strategy.
But "better" it is not. When the attacker controls the CA and your OS there is nothing "better".
Those days the Web Browser and the apps hapilly sending telemetry over the internet are the main entry point for an attacker. And yet we see statements like "if you use E2EE you are secure.
- palata 3y ago> But "better" it is not. It is better against many attackers. Just not the ones you choose to consider. There is no such thing as "if you do this you are secure", it depends on your threat model.