4 ms·
I don’t think it would be legal to do that (record). EDIT: It’s illegal, GA 21-2-413. I’m not sure how the validation works, but I assume that there is an ident
by drewmol 3y ago
I don’t think it would be legal to do that (record). EDIT: It’s illegal, GA 21-2-413. I’m not sure how the validation works, but I assume that there is an identifier in the QR code, and it likely doesn’t have plaintext candidate names so I’m not sure if you could even validate the QR code with available data, but it would most certainly be a crime.
The scenario they exposed as possible is : voter receives a printout paper ballot with the vote selection printed correctly in text, but the included QR code has modified selection(s). That paper is then fed into the reader/scanner/tabulation machine. No further confirmation.
The whole point of the printout is for voters to confirm their selections, the whole QR code step is a design flaw. Just print regular ballots with filled in circles that can go through a standard tabulation machine and still be read/checked by humans if you really need to add a (required) touchscreen interface to the process.
“If an attacker changes only the QR code, voters have no way to detect the change by looking at their ballots, since voters can’t read the QR code. The change might be detected in a manual recount or a risk-limiting audit (RLA) based on a review of the printed text, but that is unlikely given Georgia’s weak audit requirements, which have recently been further diluted.”
It seems very unlikely that lots of votes getting changed would get noticed to me. Maybe I have a misunderstanding of the process. An RLA would help, but Georgia has had difficulty in conducting audits due to incompetence of officials and people not following process rules, QR codes seem like unnecessary complexity.
- rudolph9 3y ago> No person shall use photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, cameras, or cellular telephones while such person is in a polling place while voting is taking place; provided, however, that a poll manager, in his or her discretion, may allow the use of photographic devices in the polling place under such conditions and limitations as the election superintendent finds appropriate, and provided, further, that no photography shall be allowed of a ballot or the face of a voting machine or DRE unit or electronic ballot marker while an elector is voting such ballot or machine or DRE unit or using such electronic ballot marker, and no photography shall be allowed of an electors list, electronic electors list, or the use of an electors list or electronic electors list. This subsection shall not prohibit the use of photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, cameras, or cellular telephones by poll officials for official purposes Yeah that’s pretty strict. It seems at least remotely plausible now. But still, I doubt the content of the QR code data is encrypted (probably cryptographically signed) especially given the vote is already written in plain text. And if votes of any significant percentage could make a difference were being switched someone would have a video (assuming the QR code data contains the chosen vote in plane text)