4 ms·
The padding oracle challenge has just been the gift that keeps on giving. I wrote a Ruby Gem for exploiting this: https://github.com/technion/paddingoracle htt
by technion 3y ago
The padding oracle challenge has just been the gift that keeps on giving. I wrote a Ruby Gem for exploiting this:
https://github.com/technion/paddingoracle https://github.com/technion/paddingoracle
I've since used it in the wild several times. It is shocking how prevalent the issue is, I suspect because everybody "used a a trusted AES library" and therefore believes they've complied with general crypto recommendations.
Before /r/javascript went private recently I could reply to a post about nearly any project that claimed to use crypto and explain this vulnerability.
- tptacek 3y agoIn fairness, the CBC oracle was by some margin the most widely exploited vulnerability in cryptography prior to our challenges. I credit us a little bit with popularizing the BB'98 RSA padding oracle, though, which is similarly prevalent.
- EGreg 3y agoDo you consider HMAC-SHA1 to still be secure for the foreseeable future? Or you know of something that can get close to breaking it? It seems to be quantum-resistant too.
- mewmew07 3y agoI think this is answered in the 'Symmetric “Signatures”' section of the Cryptographic Right Answers blog post of 2018. > Avoid: custom “keyed hash” constructions, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, complex polynomial MACs, encrypted hashes, CRC. https://latacora.micro.blog/2018/04/03/cryptographic-right-answers.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2018/04/03/cryptographic-right-a...