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> but note that you've made two arguments. Apologies if I was not clear, but I only intended to present the "heuristic" argument. > The second does not. Someo
by Hermitian909 3y ago
> but note that you've made two arguments.
Apologies if I was not clear, but I only intended to present the "heuristic" argument.
> The second does not. Someone who has this heuristic is violating expected utility. Maybe you didn't believe EUT to start with.
I did not think this was the case, but I think I disagree with any utilitarianism that did not allow me to weight probabilities via epistemic uncertainty.
Another way to frame my argument here that people have a justified belief that the prima facie probabilities for these gambles are misleading in a way that disadvantages them. If you allow this to change the probabilities then EUT would seem to explain the behavior e.g. if I believe Gamble A has P(0.33~) and Gamble B is weighted down to P(0.3) due to epistemic uncertainty the experimental results match up with the math.
If we allow the above calculation I think we're still in bounds for EUT.
- dash2 3y agoSure, but you can't simultaneously hold P(red) = 0.33 and P(red) = 0.3. Yet people asked to make two choices will strictly prefer "red" but also strictly prefer "black or yellow". If red is a better gamble, then red or black must be a better gamble too! It's the same urn. You're right in general that uncertainty aversion has been put forward as an explanation. But to model it, you have to break EUT.