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Thank you, I’ve always highlighted most of these points here in HN and I get heavily downvoted and attacked being “paranoid”, how is it paranoid if you don’t ev

by AHOHA 3y ago

Thank you, I’ve always highlighted most of these points here in HN and I get heavily downvoted and attacked being “paranoid”, how is it paranoid if you don’t even have a way to confirm the physical servers are secure from memory injection attacks/boot attacks/etc.? How would you verify after the audit, something was changed? Phone numbers are inherently have broken security by protocol design (and I personally have a lot of personal work on attacking GSM protocol, and I know how easy it’s for 3 letters agencies with enough funding and access to exploit it), why I don’t have an option to choose? Why it was shilled so hard that time when WhatsApp went dark? There’s a LOT of sketchy things, there’s noway I would trust it, never will.

woodruffw 3y ago
The point of an E2E cryptographic design is that you don’t ever need to trust the server — the server can be as malicious as it pleases, so long as you can affirmatively demonstrate that the client never communicates anything that isn’t encrypted with a key the server has no access to.
- OfSanguineFire 3y ago
  That was the original argument. But Signal has now rolled out functionality (sharing of contact lists and other details with the server through Intel SGX) that does force one to trust the server.
  - News-Dog 3y ago
    >being “paranoid” - Ask yourself... Do you have absolute trust in your; - Hardware - Firmware - O/S - app(s) - ISP - internet - Governments (Yours and Others) Did you answer 'No' to any?
    - sshine 3y ago
      From TFA: > E2EE is meaningless if the client and the network are the same Using modern, networked computers does involve a lot of trust. But as long as it's not one company delivering the whole stack, some attacks require a gradually more unlikely scenario where a lot of parties across the world would have to cooperate, and the cost of an exploit that traverses the software stack becomes so expensive that targeting you is out of scope.

by AHOHA 3y ago

woodruffw 3y ago

The point of an E2E cryptographic design is that you don’t ever need to trust the server — the server can be as malicious as it pleases, so long as you can affirmatively demonstrate that the client never communicates anything that isn’t encrypted with a key the server has no access to.

OfSanguineFire 3y ago
That was the original argument. But Signal has now rolled out functionality (sharing of contact lists and other details with the server through Intel SGX) that does force one to trust the server.
- News-Dog 3y ago
  >being “paranoid” - Ask yourself... Do you have absolute trust in your; - Hardware - Firmware - O/S - app(s) - ISP - internet - Governments (Yours and Others) Did you answer 'No' to any?
  - sshine 3y ago
    From TFA: > E2EE is meaningless if the client and the network are the same Using modern, networked computers does involve a lot of trust. But as long as it's not one company delivering the whole stack, some attacks require a gradually more unlikely scenario where a lot of parties across the world would have to cooperate, and the cost of an exploit that traverses the software stack becomes so expensive that targeting you is out of scope.