4 ms·

My primary issue with Signal is that they’re a USA-based org, and AFAIK a NSL would allow the US government to collect the same metadata they could with SMS or

by poink 3y ago

My primary issue with Signal is that they’re a USA-based org, and AFAIK a NSL would allow the US government to collect the same metadata they could with SMS or iMessage They might not have the contents of your messages, but they know who you’re talking to, and when

tptacek 3y ago
Remember that if you're not USA based, NSA doesn't need an NSL to collect information from you; they can just own you up, and that is literally their chartered purpose. That's not to say you should use US providers! Just that NSLs aren't a good reason to pick a provider. Pick a service that doesn't have information to share about you in the first place as your high order bit.
- poink 3y ago
  For sure! I’m assuming TAO or whomever can come after me at any point for manufactured reasons, if nothing else. Nothing I can do there… I do think this matters in a general sense, because state actors targeting individual users is a completely different threat from state actors collecting the communication graph of a major hub.
- jjtheblunt 3y ago
  No it is not literally their charter. SIGINT is one half their chartered purpose. The other half is SIGSEC. And I had good reason to know directly.
  - tptacek 3y ago
    The IAD mission protects our assets, not those of foreign sovereigns or their citizens.
- lmm 3y ago
  > Remember that if you're not USA based, NSA doesn't need an NSL to collect information from you; they can just own you up, and that is literally their chartered purpose. "Owning you up" is harder (not impossible, but harder) when they can't simply send a letter and bring the force of the law to bear. NSLs are a very good reason to avoid any system that requires you to use a provider that has a presence in the US (and there are analogous concerns about e.g. AU, and obviously any country where legal and practical protections are weak enough that a strongman can just send a team of thugs round is a nonstarter). But really any specific country is beside the point; it should be table stakes for a serious cryptosystem that one can avoid depending on any single point (and make choices based on one's own trust base vs available resources) whether that's for relay servers, app maintenance, or anything else. > Pick a service that doesn't have information to share about you in the first place as your high order bit. True enough; obviously trusting your security to a system that requires you to use a phone number identity is laughable in the first place.
  - md_ 3y ago
    Eh. Agreed re: table stakes. But I think it's quite valid to suggest users should carefully think about the tradeoffs between being subject to legal disclosure and being subject to compromise. Basically, do you trust the FISA courts, or do you trust the code? The answer isn't really obvious! When it's a random anonymous startup based in, like, Panama that claims to have reinvented JavaScript-based encryption or whatever, yeah, I sorta trust the FISA courts more!
    - sam_lowry_ 3y ago
      [flagged]
      - md_ 3y ago
        No, I wasn't talking about Telegram. I was making a general statement about crappy e2ee startups with bad designs and accountability. There was a recent one using Sealed.io whose name I forget. Re Telegram, sure, use what you like. https://www.pwnallthethings.com/p/russia-is-spying-on-telegram-chats https://www.pwnallthethings.com/p/russia-is-spying-on-telegr...
        sam_lowry_ 3y ago
        Read the story, but did not understood what's wrong with Telegram. Sounds like a FUD campaign.
      - tptacek 3y ago
        Telegram's cryptography is objectively inferior to every other messaging app. It is anything but "tried and battle-tested". The idea of selecting Telegram over Signal to protect metadata is risible.
    - lmm 3y ago
      Meh. All secure systems are alike, each insecure system is insecure in its own way. Like, yes, there are absolutely systems whose code is weak enough that I trust them less than the US authorities (I wouldn't say the FISA courts - isn't that the court that's declined like 3 warrants ever?). But that doesn't make having a presence in the US any less dangerous!

by poink 3y ago

tptacek 3y ago

Remember that if you're not USA based, NSA doesn't need an NSL to collect information from you; they can just own you up, and that is literally their chartered purpose. That's not to say you should use US providers! Just that NSLs aren't a good reason to pick a provider. Pick a service that doesn't have information to share about you in the first place as your high order bit.

poink 3y ago
For sure! I’m assuming TAO or whomever can come after me at any point for manufactured reasons, if nothing else. Nothing I can do there… I do think this matters in a general sense, because state actors targeting individual users is a completely different threat from state actors collecting the communication graph of a major hub.
jjtheblunt 3y ago
No it is not literally their charter. SIGINT is one half their chartered purpose. The other half is SIGSEC. And I had good reason to know directly.
- tptacek 3y ago
  The IAD mission protects our assets, not those of foreign sovereigns or their citizens.
lmm 3y ago
> Remember that if you're not USA based, NSA doesn't need an NSL to collect information from you; they can just own you up, and that is literally their chartered purpose. "Owning you up" is harder (not impossible, but harder) when they can't simply send a letter and bring the force of the law to bear. NSLs are a very good reason to avoid any system that requires you to use a provider that has a presence in the US (and there are analogous concerns about e.g. AU, and obviously any country where legal and practical protections are weak enough that a strongman can just send a team of thugs round is a nonstarter). But really any specific country is beside the point; it should be table stakes for a serious cryptosystem that one can avoid depending on any single point (and make choices based on one's own trust base vs available resources) whether that's for relay servers, app maintenance, or anything else. > Pick a service that doesn't have information to share about you in the first place as your high order bit. True enough; obviously trusting your security to a system that requires you to use a phone number identity is laughable in the first place.
- md_ 3y ago
  Eh. Agreed re: table stakes. But I think it's quite valid to suggest users should carefully think about the tradeoffs between being subject to legal disclosure and being subject to compromise. Basically, do you trust the FISA courts, or do you trust the code? The answer isn't really obvious! When it's a random anonymous startup based in, like, Panama that claims to have reinvented JavaScript-based encryption or whatever, yeah, I sorta trust the FISA courts more!
  - sam_lowry_ 3y ago
    [flagged]
    - md_ 3y ago
      No, I wasn't talking about Telegram. I was making a general statement about crappy e2ee startups with bad designs and accountability. There was a recent one using Sealed.io whose name I forget. Re Telegram, sure, use what you like. https://www.pwnallthethings.com/p/russia-is-spying-on-telegram-chats https://www.pwnallthethings.com/p/russia-is-spying-on-telegr...
      - sam_lowry_ 3y ago
        Read the story, but did not understood what's wrong with Telegram. Sounds like a FUD campaign.
    - tptacek 3y ago
      Telegram's cryptography is objectively inferior to every other messaging app. It is anything but "tried and battle-tested". The idea of selecting Telegram over Signal to protect metadata is risible.
  - lmm 3y ago
    Meh. All secure systems are alike, each insecure system is insecure in its own way. Like, yes, there are absolutely systems whose code is weak enough that I trust them less than the US authorities (I wouldn't say the FISA courts - isn't that the court that's declined like 3 warrants ever?). But that doesn't make having a presence in the US any less dangerous!