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We know what the solutions are. Because they were implemented in the 1930s, and removed in the 1980s and 1990s as "deregulation". - The US needs Glass-Stegall
by Animats 3y ago
We know what the solutions are. Because they were implemented in the 1930s, and removed in the 1980s and 1990s as "deregulation".
- The US needs Glass-Stegall back. That's the requirement that banks and brokerages must be completely separate companies. The argument for repealing Glass-Stegall was that banks were now so smart that they didn't need such severe restrictions to prevent collapse from bad investment decisions. The banks were wrong.
- Companies should only be allowed one class of voting stock. The New York Stock Exchange used to require that, back when the NYSE had real power. Allowing multiple classes of voting stock is what gives us President for Life CEOs such as Google and Facebook have.
- No stock buybacks. Illegal in the US from the 1930s to 1981. The US recently banned stock buybacks for 12 months for companies which received coronavirus funding.[1] But that was a one time thing. During periods of low interest rates, companies tended to buy back their own stock with borrowed money to prop up the stock price. This mostly benefits executives with stock options.
- Limits on complexity of corporate organization. This was a thing for utility companies until a decade or so ago. They were limited to a tree depth of 3 in ownership. This was to make regulation easier and reduce the risk of bankruptcy cascades. See "Enron".
- Utility deregulation. Regulated utilities used to be standard. They got a monopoly in exchange for regulation. Since they were allowed a fixed rate of return on investment for rate-setting purposes, they were not hugely profitable but were very stable. The argument in the 1980s for deregulation is that utilities tended to overspend on infrastructure, building about 10% more stuff than they really needed. With deregulation, that money could go to stockholders. When Pacific Gas and Electric was deregulated, the company went bankrupt in only a few years, leaving the stockholders with nothing. And consumer prices went up in deregulated states vs regulated ones.[2]
- Tax law favors debt, where interest is deductible as a business expense, over dividends, which are not deductible. This encourages taking on too much debt.
- US bankruptcy law allows "secured creditors" too much security. Bankruptcy is too easy on lenders and too hard on accidental creditors.
What we need is a return to conservative financial principles.
[1] https://smartasset.com/financial-advisor/stock-buyback-ban https://smartasset.com/financial-advisor/stock-buyback-ban
[2] https://ceepr.mit.edu/deregulation-market-power-and-prices-evidence-from-the-electricity-sector/ https://ceepr.mit.edu/deregulation-market-power-and-prices-e...
- kortilla 3y agoBanning buybacks without banning dividends is pure stupidity. The only reason the former is preferred is because of the tax effect on the shareholders. If you ban buybacks it will just go back to dividends with the exact same outcome (companies giving money to shareholders).
- photonbeam 3y agoDividends mess with incentives for executives less. Buybacks can make stock price pumps when stock option contract clauses are nearing.
- harshreality 3y agoHuh? Buybacks give money to shareholders who sell. Dividends give money to shareholders who don't sell. That's a big difference. Furthermore, the primary reason stock is worth what it is, originates from actual or potential dividends (if they stopped reinvesting or hoarding) companies (could) pay. That money has to go somewhere. Either it's hoarded or reinvested in infrastructure or spent frivolously on sweetheart contracts to friends of corporate management. But, crucially, without dividends, none of that can be recaptured by current shareholders. In theory, if shareholders of a company wanted an actual, not virtual, dividend, a stable material return on their investment, currently they could force a change in management that would pay out a dividend. In what you propose, that's not an option. The value of a stock without dividends is almost purely speculative: who's going to be holding the stock when the company's assets are liquidated and returned (minus liabilities) to the stockholders, and what those net assets will amount to when the company is voluntarily or involuntarily shut down—neither of which is a particularly good sign for the state of the company when that happens. Doing away with dividends seems like it would lead to more instability: all the craziness of VC-style investing, but for public companies that are no longer early-stage growth. How could you have stable businesses or an economy when stockholders are driven, not by the promise of a share of profits this quarter or even an easily countable number of years from now, but by a share of the company's assets when the company is no longer a viable entity? How are those kinds of shareholders going to make good decisions about corporate governance? I'm mostly on board with the essay, and the need to change things. However, getting rid of dividends (along with buybacks) without radically restructuring everything else... how does that work? How could it? What am I missing?