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Yes, but why do we intuitively avoid epistemic uncertainty, even though it is something which can only _give_ us an edge here? To make clear: playing this game
by 317070 3y ago
Yes, but why do we intuitively avoid epistemic uncertainty, even though it is something which can only _give_ us an edge here?
To make clear: playing this game with an urn which has an equal amount of red and green balls, is the worst case scenario when you get to pick the colour that wins. The second urn can only be the same or better, whether or not you can figure out any information about the balls in it.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- gonehome 3y agoIn a one time game it’s a 50% known bet vs. an unknown bet. 50% is not bad odds?
- peteradio 3y agoBecause the real consequence of losing is not $0, so there is (potentially unacceptable) cost to gain knowledge which gives you enough edge to win?
- cubefox 3y agoIt can only give us an edge in the repetition case. And the Ellsberg paradox doesn't apply to the repetition case. Ellsberg doesn't say anything about people preferring the first urn in the repetition case. In fact, I see no evidence that they do.