Everything about io_uring has screamed security nightmare from day 1--the amount of kernel attack surface it opens up, the fact it put little thought into how i

Everything about io_uring has screamed security nightmare from day 1--the amount of kernel attack surface it opens up, the fact it put little thought into how it interacted with process and privilege boundaries and related overarching models (see, e.g., interactions with setuid and fork/clone), increased opportunity to exploit race conditions, etc. From a pure performance standpoint it's amazing, but it's circumventing a slew of interfaces that were, at least in part, designed to restrict process privilege--more importantly than merely designed, but refined and bug-fixed over decades. The use of lockless buffers for high throughput IPC works better in microkernel designs. Linux being a monolithic kernel, io_uring is like one, big trap door for exploits.