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Signing with the TPM doesn't work super well, given that the TPM's inherent keys can't be used for signing as a privacy protection mechanism. You'd need to stor
by mjg59 3y ago
Signing with the TPM doesn't work super well, given that the TPM's inherent keys can't be used for signing as a privacy protection mechanism. You'd need to store an encrypted key in the image that could be used for signing purposes, but what stops an attacker from simply wiring up the TPM directly, generating a new key pair, and storing that instead? This is a legitimately difficult problem to solve well.
- noja 3y ago> but what stops an attacker from simply wiring up the TPM directly, generating a new key pair, and storing that instead Simply? Did you just equate resetting a bios password with wiring up a TPM and generating a new key pair?
- mjg59 3y agoThe situation we're discussing already involves taking the machine apart to short the security eeprom during boot. Once you've accepted physical attacks as part of your threat model it seems reasonable to say that any mitigations you're designing should be resilient to physical attacks as well.
- xxs 3y agoTPM is nonsense, i can trivially replace the processor/TPM module w/ whatever I wish.
- xaduha 3y agoIf it was used to encrypt a disk, then what does replacing TPM accomplish exactly?