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2) is solved with HSTS [3]. You can contact me (@chromium.org) to be built in. There isn't a notability requirement. I don't understand that. If I serve http:/
by skrebbel 15y ago
2) is solved with HSTS [3]. You can contact me (@chromium.org) to be built in. There isn't a notability requirement.
I don't understand that. If I serve http://example.com/mypage http://example.com/mypage which has a link to http://mint.com/justin http://mint.com/justin, you won't convert that to https://mint.com/justing https://mint.com/justing, right? Even if example.com has HSTS enabled? Cause that would assume that mint.com has https, or else the whole thing breaks.
Cause in that case a man in the middle can just insert links to other domains (say, http://examp1e.com/myotherpage http://examp1e.com/myotherpage when I was serving a link to http://example.com/myotherpage http://example.com/myotherpage) and still have the attack work. Like the GP said, only starting at an HTTPS page would solve this.
But you're the expert and I'm not, so what am I missing? :-)
- coderrr 15y agoas long as mint.com has HSTS and either the user has been there once before or it was hard coded into the browser as an HSTS domain then the browser will never visit http://mint.com http://mint.com, it will immediately go to https://mint.com https://mint.com EDIT: and well it doesn't seem that mint.com even has HSTS enabled... so bad example :P