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Remember that Apple's "debacle" there was to comply with US law. Their issue was that (at the time) they were responsible for encrypted data backup's contents.
by HWR_14 3y ago
Remember that Apple's "debacle" there was to comply with US law. Their issue was that (at the time) they were responsible for encrypted data backup's contents. So they could either scan on your device before backing up, or scan on the cloud. Scanning on your device, while it sounds scarier, actually offered more privacy protections, because otherwise their cloud needed to see your unencrypted data. And it only scanned on your device if you wanted to move things to the cloud.
- sneak 3y agoThis is false. Apple already scans everything on iCloud for banned material serverside, as iCloud Photos and iMessage are, for most people, not e2ee, and never will be so long as e2ee is opt-in. Even if you enable the e2ee features rolled out in the last 12 months, your iMessages are still not e2ee unless all of your conversation partners have as well. Also there is no US law demanding scanning of user data, your opening assertion refers to nonexistent requirements.
- astrange 3y agoIt's more about proposed EU laws than US laws.
- shuckles 3y agoBasically every claim in your comment is wrong: * iCloud Photo Library was not scanned for CSAM content at the time of the announcement, which Apple confirmed at the time. * iMessage E2E encryption is not opt-in. There isn't even an opt-out. * The "E2EE features" you might be referring to is Advanced Data Protection for iCloud Backups, which is not related to the iMessage protocol at all. You don't have any guarantees about what your recipients are doing with the data you send them, ever. There is US law which is ambiguous about the requirement on data providers to check content for CSAM material, which many have interpreted to require a check. This is why every other major cloud provider does scan for the content.
- sneak 3y ago> iMessage E2E encryption is not opt-in. There isn't even an opt-out. This is incorrect. iCloud Backup escrows endpoint keys for "Messages in iCloud" to Apple every night in a non-e2ee fashion, which means that a non-endpoint has the keys, which means that iMessage is not e2ee. Apple has real-time access to plaintext of almost every single iMessage that transits their service. The only case in which they don't is where both users either don't have iCloud Backup enabled or both users have enabled e2ee iCloud Backup.