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OP's identified problem: Sometimes good projects are unable to proceed because some small set of losers of the project veto it. OP's policy proposal: "for a de

OP's identified problem: Sometimes good projects are unable to proceed because some small set of losers of the project veto it. OP's policy proposal: "for a development worth doing, it should be possible to pay off most of the people who object and still make the development worthwhile." OP recognizes that some people will pretend that their losses are very large even when they are quite small. "But if we could clearly and strictly demarcate the “true losers” from a project, and allow them to retain their veto, we would perhaps be on the way to making this intractable problem tractable " They don't really have a clear idea on how to correctly identify the "true losers". In fact, I would argue that identifying true losers is where the intractability of the larger problem emerges from.

tommy5dollar 3y ago
Well, it sounds like you could come up with a set of useful heuristics, like living next door to the property. It feels intrinsically pretty cheems to just say "this sounds tricky so we shouldn't bother" when the existing system is completely dysfunctional
- abdullahkhalids 3y ago
  > Well, it sounds like you could come up with a set of useful heuristics, like living next door to the property. This is a political problem, so it recurses quite a lot. Whatever set of heuristics you come up with, someone will object to them because they will be losers if we use those heuristics. Then someone will object to the composition of the committee that generated the heuristics. Then someone will object to the system that system that came up with the committee.... Of course, we should try to figure out solutions. But these are "wicked problem" [1]. Solutions are not easy to come by, and there will always be objectors. You can't turn this into a well-defined technical problem with a well-formed solution. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem
NoMoreNicksLeft 3y ago
Part of the problem is that this isn't as fungible as economics leads us to believe. If some working class knob will lose his home, then it's often enough to just offer him twice as much as the home is worth (maybe with helping him find another equivalent home). Such a person knows that it's a good deal, and they end up better off for it. Any perceived reluctance is often just a negotiating tactic, and can be quickly resolved by making the bargain sweeter. But if Sterling Fitzbillionaire has a mansion with the most beautiful and exclusive view of the shoreline has to put up with an offshore windmill... there's literally no amount of money that makes up for him losing this. You could offer him $10 trillion, and the money is worthless because the mansion with that view is rare enough (or even unique) that money can't buy him another one like it with an unspoiled view. You've reached the fungibility limits of money/property. Say whatever you want about greed or spitefulness, there is a much more fundamental issue going on here, and it doesn't seem very tractable. It's only aggravated by the plain fact that such people are often in much more influential positions, if not in political offices outright. The best I can come up with is by disallowing the vetoes entirely, unless they are accompanied by some counter-offer that outlines what would be required for them to withdraw it. Wouldn't matter so much whether the terms were absurd (or seemingly impossible), by forcing them to draft those, it might shift their mindset enough that negotiations (however troubled) could commence. I'm not certain this works, you'd have to run the experiment. I think it might solve some minor fraction of these issues, maybe that improvement's better than nothing.
- abdullahkhalids 3y ago
  You make a useful point. I will note though that you don't have to be rich to not care about money. For instance, many people will refuse to give up their ancestral home or land no matter what money or other incentives you offer them.

tommy5dollar 3y ago

Well, it sounds like you could come up with a set of useful heuristics, like living next door to the property. It feels intrinsically pretty cheems to just say "this sounds tricky so we shouldn't bother" when the existing system is completely dysfunctional

abdullahkhalids 3y ago
> Well, it sounds like you could come up with a set of useful heuristics, like living next door to the property. This is a political problem, so it recurses quite a lot. Whatever set of heuristics you come up with, someone will object to them because they will be losers if we use those heuristics. Then someone will object to the composition of the committee that generated the heuristics. Then someone will object to the system that system that came up with the committee.... Of course, we should try to figure out solutions. But these are "wicked problem" [1]. Solutions are not easy to come by, and there will always be objectors. You can't turn this into a well-defined technical problem with a well-formed solution. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem

NoMoreNicksLeft 3y ago

Part of the problem is that this isn't as fungible as economics leads us to believe. If some working class knob will lose his home, then it's often enough to just offer him twice as much as the home is worth (maybe with helping him find another equivalent home). Such a person knows that it's a good deal, and they end up better off for it. Any perceived reluctance is often just a negotiating tactic, and can be quickly resolved by making the bargain sweeter. But if Sterling Fitzbillionaire has a mansion with the most beautiful and exclusive view of the shoreline has to put up with an offshore windmill... there's literally no amount of money that makes up for him losing this. You could offer him $10 trillion, and the money is worthless because the mansion with that view is rare enough (or even unique) that money can't buy him another one like it with an unspoiled view. You've reached the fungibility limits of money/property. Say whatever you want about greed or spitefulness, there is a much more fundamental issue going on here, and it doesn't seem very tractable. It's only aggravated by the plain fact that such people are often in much more influential positions, if not in political offices outright. The best I can come up with is by disallowing the vetoes entirely, unless they are accompanied by some counter-offer that outlines what would be required for them to withdraw it. Wouldn't matter so much whether the terms were absurd (or seemingly impossible), by forcing them to draft those, it might shift their mindset enough that negotiations (however troubled) could commence. I'm not certain this works, you'd have to run the experiment. I think it might solve some minor fraction of these issues, maybe that improvement's better than nothing.

abdullahkhalids 3y ago
You make a useful point. I will note though that you don't have to be rich to not care about money. For instance, many people will refuse to give up their ancestral home or land no matter what money or other incentives you offer them.