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Ballot verifiability is not impossible by any stretch of the imagination. A person fills out a ballot, that ballot is [optically] scanned and then automatically
by somenameforme 3y ago
Ballot verifiability is not impossible by any stretch of the imagination. A person fills out a ballot, that ballot is [optically] scanned and then automatically parsed a la scantron. Both the ballot and the resultant scan are published side by side.
Optionally, add an ID on each ballot and people can not only look at all 162 million ballots, but even verify that their ballot properly scanned, published, and counted. The only argument against this is that ballot verifiability is a bad thing, because it might enable e.g. vote buying or whatever. Yet somehow people were perfectly fine with there being more than 26,000,000 votes made by mail in 2020 in which such threats are dramatically greater.
The nice thing about this solution is also that there's no 'classified' data. The complete transparency of it all would make any sort of stuffing or vote manipulation effectively impossible, which means there's no need for ultra-sophisticated systems. Plain old 1990s tech of digital scanners and scantron would work just fine. Ballot observers would need to do little more than count the number of people coming into a station and ensure that matches the total number of ballots eventually published by that station.
What's not to prefer about this relative to the status quo?
- thephyber 3y agoSpoken like someone who has never actually looked at how an election works in a county in the USA, doesn’t care about the actual legal requirements, seems to ignore all concerns for accessibility (eg. Scantrons are terrible for old people with bad/no eyesight, have motor control issues with hands, etc), doesn’t know what scantrons actually did with the scan results, hasn’t thought through the complexity of ID in the USA (we don’t have a single ID number and the alternative is to store photo ID cards for everyone to see and collect) and doesn’t have a plan for absentee voters or military deployed voters. And that doesn’t even address any of the human factors (eg. people lose their ID, they lose their ballot, ballots get crumpled by voters and stuck in the scanners, electricity isn’t up 99.999% of the time, etc). Elections are hard for a reason — the requirements are complex. Everyone wants 160million+ votes to be collected, counted, and results published by 9p on election day. Everyone wants the registry to work perfectly and wants the convenience of not having to travel far to a polling place. In practice, these create a huge number of hurdles that election officials must navigate, plan for contingencies (eg. the hurricane immediately before the election in Florida 2022). Maybe my best advice to you is the snide “don’t reinvent the wheel in Hacker News comments, but rather get involved as a polling place volunteer next year, then see all of the edge cases in action”. Then don’t propose your MVP v2 to me, propose it to your county election board. Only you will be ignored because elections in the US have 250 years of learning from the previous errors, but you seem quite content to ignore all of those hard-earned lessons.
- somenameforme 3y agoLet me point one thing out here - and don't take it the wrong way. Instead of finding any meaningful flaw with the idea you pointed to one edge case, which is a problem in even the current system and then moved onto a mixture of ad hominem and appeal to authority. I only mention this because you may well not even realize you're behaving (or thinking) this way. But back to the issue, nothing you offered is a meaningful hurdle or a new problem introduced by "my" rather obvious solution. The issues would generally be handled using the exact same workarounds, because they're also issues in the current system. For instance if somebody is blind, enfeebled, or otherwise unable to vote without assistance, then assistance can be rendered in a fashion similar to the current status quo. They can bring a family member to assist, and if that's not possible then aid can be rendered with an assistant from each 'side' helping simultaneously. And so on. This is precisely why I said "What's not to prefer about this relative to the status quo?" You get a system that improves the status quo exponentially, and introduces no new downsides. Basically America is obviously becoming far more divided. Our politicians and "political figures" in general are, if not simply becoming even more unethical, then having their lies and deceptions exposed in a far more realtime and active fashion. This is understandably sending trust to some value approaching zero. You simply cannot have systems where trust in a large component in its operation, and expect people to simply have faith in the results.
- pandaman 3y agoThe "Has my ballot been counted?", which you are solving here, is not really a problem or not the entire problem of verifiability. The problem is "Has every counted ballot been cast by a person who: has the right to vote, and has not voted elsewhere?", I don't see how this can be easily solved in a secret ballot.
- somenameforme 3y agoThis has been solved pretty easily in literally every other developed country in the world. You show up to the ballot office, present some form of recognized identification, and your name is scratched off a list. If you want to be fancy, you can centralize the list. Having some basic form of identification is a prerequisite to being an at all involved member of society.
- pandaman 3y agoI doubt this. Don't some developed countries have mail voting? I am pretty sure Australia does, for one.
- somenameforme 3y agoAustralia's relatively unique in that they have compulsory voting. This helps remove some of the threat vectors, like voter impersonation. You can't just find an inactive voter and turn in papers on his behalf. But in spite of this built in protection they also have numerous other safeguards. You read about them here [1]. They include, but are not limited to: - Needing to request a ballot, and including a security question/answer. The security answer will be cross referenced when returned to avoid somebody filling out a mail-in ballot that was not their own. - One must already be enrolled to vote (which implies ID verification) when requesting a ballot, and the ballot request also requires knowledge of the address used to register to vote, though the ballot itself can be sent to another address for e.g. expats or whatever. - When filling out the ballot, you are also required to have a witness sign it, affirming that it was you who filled it out. And that witness must be on the electoral roll. It's definitely not perfect, but it's vastly better than what we have. And targeting some reasonable fears like impersonation, harvesting, and so on. And I think that effort to target these fears is, in reality, just as important as whether or not it even does, or if those fears are even justified. Because, again it's all about perception. Anything they can be done to help increase the perception of transparency and security in elections, without meaningfully encumbering the process, should be done. [1] - https://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/Publications/easy-read/files/vote-mail-easy-eng.pdf https://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/Publications/easy-read/file...