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For certain things in signal you need to trust the server hardware and suspicious technologies like SGX. SGX is a prime target for a NSA backdoor. That some upp

by c00lio 3y ago

For certain things in signal you need to trust the server hardware and suspicious technologies like SGX. SGX is a prime target for a NSA backdoor. That some upper-layer software there is open source (with lots of caveats, e.g. you cannot verify which server version is really running and signal has a history of lagging behind on publishing their "open source" version of the server code) is a distraction at best.

jruohonen 3y ago
Don't forget side-channels in SGX.
_kbh_ 3y ago
> For certain things in signal you need to trust the server hardware and suspicious technologies like SGX. SGX is a prime target for a NSA backdoor. That some upper-layer software there is open source (with lots of caveats, e.g. you cannot verify which server version is really running and signal has a history of lagging behind on publishing their "open source" version of the server code) is a distraction at best. Before you worry about super expensive hard to remove hardware bugs, you should worry far more about the software running on that hardware. It is much more likely that theres bugs in the software than the hardware.
- c00lio 3y ago
  Yes, of course you are right. My comment was meant more along the lines of "even if the software were ultimately trustworthy because of open source, thousand eyes, careful development and fairy dust, those hardware problems would still be a way in".
upofadown 3y ago
Those "certain things" have nothing to do with message security. The SGX thing was an idea intended to provide a bit better protection against metadata leakage about who was talking to who. It turned out that there were other ways to get that sort of metadata. Does Signal even use the SGX stuff anymore?
- c4mpute 3y ago
  Signal backup encryption works by trusting SGX. If you cannot trust SGX, you have to assume the attacker can decrypt your signal backups, of course including all media and messages.
deleted 3y ago
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by c00lio 3y ago

jruohonen 3y ago

Don't forget side-channels in SGX.

_kbh_ 3y ago

> For certain things in signal you need to trust the server hardware and suspicious technologies like SGX. SGX is a prime target for a NSA backdoor. That some upper-layer software there is open source (with lots of caveats, e.g. you cannot verify which server version is really running and signal has a history of lagging behind on publishing their "open source" version of the server code) is a distraction at best. Before you worry about super expensive hard to remove hardware bugs, you should worry far more about the software running on that hardware. It is much more likely that theres bugs in the software than the hardware.

c00lio 3y ago
Yes, of course you are right. My comment was meant more along the lines of "even if the software were ultimately trustworthy because of open source, thousand eyes, careful development and fairy dust, those hardware problems would still be a way in".

upofadown 3y ago

Those "certain things" have nothing to do with message security. The SGX thing was an idea intended to provide a bit better protection against metadata leakage about who was talking to who. It turned out that there were other ways to get that sort of metadata. Does Signal even use the SGX stuff anymore?

c4mpute 3y ago
Signal backup encryption works by trusting SGX. If you cannot trust SGX, you have to assume the attacker can decrypt your signal backups, of course including all media and messages.

deleted 3y ago

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