4 ms·

I don't know. Seems like this only affects people with no opsec. Surely if you're doing stuff on the internet you think is likely to attract attention from law

I don't know. Seems like this only affects people with no opsec. Surely if you're doing stuff on the internet you think is likely to attract attention from law enforcement you're at the least using a different browser profile than the one you use to post your cat memes and food pictures?? Surely you'd be using a different browser or even device.

dredmorbius 3y ago
I've become all but convinced over the past decade or so (largely though not entirely post-Snowden) that opsec matters far less than immunity and/or impunity. The difference between those last two is that immunity is actual freedom from consequence, whilst impunity may be the impression of invulnerability (leaning heavily on the sense of the word as "rashness or inconsideration" ... I'm aware that this may not be entirely standard or customary usage). The upshot is that the immune know that they cannot be touched, the impudent believe that they cannot be touched. The former is a more robust protection, the latter may prove highly brittle. (Activities of participants in the events of 6 Jan 2021 come to mind.) The distinction between either of these and opsec is that opsec must be good most or all of the time. Immmunity/impunity buy you a lot of sloppiness. A related concept is that of intelligence agencies doing far less of observing information and far more of planting it. This was common practice amongst both the USA and USSR during the Cold War, as has been detailed in numerous accounts. John Crewsden and Carl Bernstein both (separately) wrote of the CIA's activities in this regard, quite often working directly with news organisations (or personnel associated with same), during the 1970s: Crewsden: "The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views" (1977) <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/the-cias-3decade-effort-to-mold-the-worlds-views-agency-network.html https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/the-cias-3decade...> (In six parts, listed and linked here: (<https://diaspora.glasswings.com/posts/cdec9a80ce3b0139a0df002590d8e506 https://diaspora.glasswings.com/posts/cdec9a80ce3b0139a0df00...>)). The story became the subject of a US Congressional investigation, documented here: <https://archive.org/details/CIAMedia1978Hearings/page/n3/mode/2up https://archive.org/details/CIAMedia1978Hearings/page/n3/mod...> Bernstein's account, "The CIA and the Media" (1977), <https://web.archive.org/web/20071026060752/http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php https://web.archive.org/web/20071026060752/http://www.carlbe...> Or that the NSA's capabilities in decoding ecrypted communications had much less to do with superhuman cryptographic hax0ring skillz, and more with flooding the market with affordable, back-doored encryption tools, via Crypto AG, a Swiss front company: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/11/crypto-ag-cia-bnd-germany-intelligence-report https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/11/crypto-ag-ci...>

dredmorbius 3y ago

I've become all but convinced over the past decade or so (largely though not entirely post-Snowden) that opsec matters far less than immunity and/or impunity. The difference between those last two is that immunity is actual freedom from consequence, whilst impunity may be the impression of invulnerability (leaning heavily on the sense of the word as "rashness or inconsideration" ... I'm aware that this may not be entirely standard or customary usage). The upshot is that the immune know that they cannot be touched, the impudent believe that they cannot be touched. The former is a more robust protection, the latter may prove highly brittle. (Activities of participants in the events of 6 Jan 2021 come to mind.) The distinction between either of these and opsec is that opsec must be good most or all of the time. Immmunity/impunity buy you a lot of sloppiness. A related concept is that of intelligence agencies doing far less of observing information and far more of planting it. This was common practice amongst both the USA and USSR during the Cold War, as has been detailed in numerous accounts. John Crewsden and Carl Bernstein both (separately) wrote of the CIA's activities in this regard, quite often working directly with news organisations (or personnel associated with same), during the 1970s: Crewsden: "The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views" (1977) <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/the-cias-3decade-effort-to-mold-the-worlds-views-agency-network.html https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/the-cias-3decade...> (In six parts, listed and linked here: (<https://diaspora.glasswings.com/posts/cdec9a80ce3b0139a0df002590d8e506 https://diaspora.glasswings.com/posts/cdec9a80ce3b0139a0df00...>)). The story became the subject of a US Congressional investigation, documented here: <https://archive.org/details/CIAMedia1978Hearings/page/n3/mode/2up https://archive.org/details/CIAMedia1978Hearings/page/n3/mod...> Bernstein's account, "The CIA and the Media" (1977), <https://web.archive.org/web/20071026060752/http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php https://web.archive.org/web/20071026060752/http://www.carlbe...> Or that the NSA's capabilities in decoding ecrypted communications had much less to do with superhuman cryptographic hax0ring skillz, and more with flooding the market with affordable, back-doored encryption tools, via Crypto AG, a Swiss front company: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/11/crypto-ag-cia-bnd-germany-intelligence-report https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/11/crypto-ag-ci...>