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State actors don't need to MitM the CA, they just order a CA they have leverage over to issue them a certificate.
by AnthonyMouse 3y ago
State actors don't need to MitM the CA, they just order a CA they have leverage over to issue them a certificate.
- tptacek 3y ago... which is then logged in CT logs.
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoAs it is if they MitM the CA.
- chrismorgan 3y agoI’m not sure how CT logs actually work, but is it impossible for the CA to issue a certificate that is not entered into the CT logs? If it’s possible, then governments would surely just require that, and then it would only be caught by interception of the actual certificate being used.
- Khoth 3y agoBrowsers won't accept a certificate unless it comes with proof that it was submitted to a CT log. So a government could MITM you but they'd have to burn a CA to do it, whether you personally noticed the attack or not, so it's a very high cost attack
- tialaramex 3y agoThe proof is an SCT, a signed document from the Log which says "I promise I logged this pre-certificate". [[ In some cases it'll be the actual certificate, but for most real world TLS certificates it's a pre-certificate with the same substantive details, if you think about it you will see why the SCT baked inside your certificate cannot mention the actual document it is baked inside ]] Now, of course at the moment this document is created, there's no way to be sure this claim is true. The logs are a distributed system. Twenty four hours later, (the Maximum Merge Delay, this is a global policy decision) the log should, if you interrogate it, be able to show you a log entry matching the SCT, which traces to the agreed Merkle Tree head for that log. If it cannot, in principle that log has failed and must be distrusted. This happens (to one of the dozens of public logs, somewhere) a few times per year on average. In principle, everybody who sees the log could agree that they see the same Merkle Tree head, thus the certificate really is logged. In practice the mechanisms to ensure this works, a Gossip protocol, do not exist and have never been deployed in practical use. It's probably fine, but without ever completing the system as designed, it does have flaws.
- agwa 3y ago> In principle, everybody who sees the log could agree that they see the same Merkle Tree head, thus the certificate really is logged. In practice the mechanisms to ensure this works, a Gossip protocol, do not exist and have never been deployed in practical use. It has been - the commercial instance of Cert Spotter gossips STHs with Chrome's SCT auditing infrastructure. Edit: here's the gossip feed of STHs observed by Chrome's SCT auditing infrastructure: https://www.gstatic.com/ct/gossip/ct/v1/sth-pollination https://www.gstatic.com/ct/gossip/ct/v1/sth-pollination And here's the gossip feed of STHs observed by Cert Spotter: https://certspotter.com/.well-known/ct/v1/sth-pollination https://certspotter.com/.well-known/ct/v1/sth-pollination
- tialaramex 3y agoOoh interesting, when did that start?
- agwa 3y ago2017, but it only started having real value once SCT auditing rolled out in 2022.
- tptacek 3y agoThis is theoretically true but not really true in practice right now. If a CA misissues a cert for something major, like Facebook or Google Mail, and Google or Mozilla find out, my current belief is that they'd be in for a world of hurt. But if a CA misissued such a cert for a single specific target, without a CT SCT, neither Chrome nor Safari will report that (currently, CAs are explicitly allowed to issue non-CT-logged certs; the check on that is that Chrome and Safari won't honor that certificate --- a reason, by the way, to reconsider Firefox). If Google found out that you'd misissued a non-logged Google Mail certificate, you'd get nuked. But there's nothing currently in place to make Google find that out. It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration. But that kind of surveillance isn't really a thing right now. I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago. Now they just don't accept certs unless they're logged, and that's that.
- agwa 3y ago> If a CA misissues a cert for something major, like Facebook or Google Mail, and Google or Mozilla find out, my current belief is that they'd be in for a world of hurt. It doesn't even need to be major. Misissuing for example.com and test.com were major factors in the distrust of Symantec and Certinomis, respectively. > It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration. This would require a pretty big paradigm shift which is hard to see happening. But as long as clients require SCTs (Firefox needs to hurry up already) this is not really necessary. > I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago. I'm pretty sure this has never been the case. I think at one point Chrome may have reported certificates for Google domains that were not issued by a Google CA, but this was unrelated to CT. Or maybe you're thinking of the Googlebot, which logs the certificates it sees while crawling the web.
- g_p 3y agoMany major browsers expect CT, and won't accept a certificate from a default CA without it being in CT. Therefore it matters a little less whether such a certificate can be issued, but rather whether it can be accepted by a browser (which many popular ones won't). And therefore it will become relatively noisy and detectable if such a certificate is deployed at any sense of scale. Chrome - https://chromestatus.com/feature/6244547273687040 https://chromestatus.com/feature/6244547273687040 Safari - https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT205280 https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT205280 Firefox doesn't support it yet though - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1281469 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1281469 In essence, a cryptographic proof that the certificate was sent to CT providers needs to be enclosed along with the certificate. That can come via an OSCP staple, or a TLS extension. More info - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Certificate_Transparency https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Certif...
- AndyMcConachie 3y agoThere is no way to prove that every cert from every CA gets logged in CT. How can I know for certain some CA out there is not creating certs and not logging them?
- agwa 3y agoCAs can issue certificates without logging them, but such certificates will lack receipts (SCTs) from CT logs, and will be rejected by major browsers.
- stereo 3y agoWhere it's just one out of hundreds of Let's Encrypt certificates. Two simple things are missing to make any of this infrastructure useful at all: - A system as easy as ACME for domain holders to revoke any certificate. A few months ago, Cloudflare started issuing certificates for domains where they're only dns hosts. They issued these certificates through the Google CA, without informing the domain owners. I only found out through a CT alert. The response when I contacted both Google and Cloudflare was a shrug and a runaround, and the certificates were never revoked. - A monitoring system that will only alert me on new certificates in the CT logs that it can't find on my infrastructure. Alternatively, an external system that will alert me if it sees a new certificate for foo.example.org that it can't see being used at foo.example.org - the low number of false positives should still make it worth it.
- agwa 3y ago> A system as easy as ACME for domain holders to revoke any certificate. ACME in fact supports this, and I expect at some point CAs will be required to support it. In the meantime, I'm working on a tool that will take a certificate, identify the true issuer, look up the CA's problem reporting email address, and provide an email template with the right words to make the CA care. If the CA supports revocation over ACME the tool will take care of revocation automatically (although you'll still have to demonstrate control over the domain). (Note however that your example is flawed because the certificate was actually authorized by virtue of making Cloudflare your DNS provider. If you don't like that, your recourse is to pick a different DNS provider which is more respectful of their customers.) > A monitoring system that will only alert me on new certificates in the CT logs that it can't find on my infrastructure. Commercial CT monitors, like Cert Spotter (my product) or Hardenize support integration with your certificate issuance infrastructure so you're only notified if the certificate is unknown. I only get CT alerts for my domains if I actually need to care. The open source version of Cert Spotter can execute a script when it discovers a certificate, and I know of users that use this to cross-check against their inventory and only send an alert if the certificate is unknown.
- throw0101b 3y ago> ACME in fact supports this, and I expect at some point CAs will be required to support it. If you use ACME to get a certificate from CA1, then you can use ACME to revoke the same certificate from CA1. But if the cert was issued from CA2 (via ACME or otherwise), there is nothing you can do about it. And even if the 'rogue' cert was also issued from CA1 as well (but under a different account), unless you have the private there is nothing you can do to revoke it; only perhaps get a completely new cert that 'supersedes' it.