> It doesn’t feel like anything to be a table or a chair. That, we don't know. It's based on assumptions, such that some biological processes must go on, beca

> It doesn’t feel like anything to be a table or a chair. That, we don't know. It's based on assumptions, such that some biological processes must go on, because. _obviously_ if they don't, there can't be this consciousness thing (that we don't know what is) going on.. It's an interesting flaw, we know we have this huge gab in our understanding of the subject, yet we have an intimate relationship with the very same phenomenon, and it might be that duality which tricks us into such assumptions as "It doesn’t feel like anything to be a table".. We can't ask a table if it feels anything, we can't induce in it, any of the measurable responses that we get when interacting with a person, for instance, and so we assume, that since we cannot observe it, this thing that we don't know what is, is not present. Until not that long ago, it was assumed that infants didn't feel pain, that animals didn't feel pain.. Now we seem to have concluded, that since they have the biological gear for it, they do in fact feel pain.. However, we strictly speaking haven't proven that the biological gear that allows us to produce measurable responses, is actually instrumental in giving rise to consciousness, rather than simply allowing expression of it.