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Yes. It seems there's some thinking around doing offline validation for DNSSEC as part of DANE, so you'd get the proofs you need from DNSSEC on the server side,
by mike_hearn 3y ago
Yes. It seems there's some thinking around doing offline validation for DNSSEC as part of DANE, so you'd get the proofs you need from DNSSEC on the server side, then combine those with a certificate and send that to TLS clients. That seems reasonable.
- tptacek 3y agoThere was an effort to staple DANE proofs to TLS handshakes, but it failed: if you could suborn a CA, you could control the TLS handshake enough to stripe the DANE proofs out, and the whole point of the DANE proofs was to avoid trusting CAs.
- mike_hearn 3y agoCatch 22. To know the server wants to exclusively use DANE you must learn that in a secure way, like via DNSSEC, but the point of DANE is to not do interactive DNSSEC queries. I guess if you're publishing an intent to use DANE stapling exclusively via DNS, then you could have tools that crawl the CT logs looking for CA issuances for domains that claim they don't want them. Though maybe detecting an attack in that way isn't worth much.
- tptacek 3y agoThere was talk of them proposing a pinning mechanism, but for understandable reasons the browser vendors were having none of it.