> These philosophers, he insists, refuse to accept the conclusions that follow from their own premises. Kierkegaard, for example, strongly senses the absurd. Bu

> These philosophers, he insists, refuse to accept the conclusions that follow from their own premises. Kierkegaard, for example, strongly senses the absurd. But rather than respecting it as the inevitable human ailment, he seeks to be cured of it by making it an attribute of a God who he then embraces. This is accurate but just in-case someone reads this and decides not to read Kierkegaard because they are secular and don't think they would get anything out of someone attempting to sell them on religion: this is not totally fair to what Kierkegaard really argues -- it may be what Camus criticized Kierkegaard for, but it's not the most charitable reading of Kierkegaard. The common theme between Sickness Unto Death and Fear and Trembling is that, while it's possible to imagine the theoretical Knight of Faith (with Abraham as a textual example) or the theoretical person-who-escapes-despair, Kierkegaard is really just making the point that it is internally consistent within the framework of Christian faith for these things to be possible, and establishes that within that framework, it is an ideal worth striving for. Fear and Trembling is about a "teleological suspension of the ethical" by a demigod named Abraham whose telos (read: purpose) is based in God -- the reason he is a demigod is because he's able to have such a degree of faith that he can casually make that movement -- to the point that he is willing to sacrifice his own son without second-thought. And Sickness Unto Death is about a teleological suspension of the absurd (to Kierkegaard, "despair") through the same mechanism. Kierkegaard repeatedly makes the case that actually making these "movements" is out-of-reach. It's not some cheap self-help book that tells you to do X, Y, and Z to make that movement, it's about exposing you to the idea that the movement exists, and torturing you for the rest of your life in your inability to make it. Camus arrives at basically the same conclusion, except with a twist of fatalism where he denies the possibility of making such a movement -- you need to come to terms with absurdism because it's inescapable. Whereas Kierkegaard would you can't make the movement because you're a shitty Christian and/or Original Sin. But I feel that the very thing that Camus criticized Kierkegaard for, Kierkegaard would have criticized Camus for: + Camus would say, "Kierkegaard is afraid of facing that absurdism is inherent to existence and holds onto false hope that there is some way out". + Kierkegaard would says, "Camus is afraid of facing the fact that he is not capable of escaping rationalism and fully basing his meaning in God, and prefers the cheap comfort of learned helplessness." They're fundamentally arguing the same thing. Whole point here is that there's something to be gained from reading Kierkegaard regardless of how inclined you are towards secularism, purely from a philosophical perspective. He's not trying to sell you on Christianity and it's not evangelical in nature. I've heard him called "the atheist maker" because he reframes faith with such a high threshold that it's impossible to meet, and it demands that people who were previously comfortable with a cheap sense of faith to come to terms with it.