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The Eclypsium blog post does state the following: "The firmware does not implement any cryptographic digital signature verification or any other validation ove
by jeroenhd 3y ago
The Eclypsium blog post does state the following:
"The firmware does not implement any cryptographic digital signature verification or any other validation over the executables."
Unless your Windows was configured to only run signed software or Gigabyte would apply the Mark of the Web to these files (which would make it harder for them to run their own update process), the executable file downloaded and run as a service doesn't seem to get checked.
As far as I can make out from the blog post, a MitM attack during the motherboard update process would allow for the motherboard to be flashed with malicious software which in turn would indeed allow for dropping Windows executables onto the system. Luckily, barely anyone uses the built-in online updater for their motherboards.
The https://software-nas/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 https://software-nas/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 URL is a pretty potential risk. You don't even need MitM to pretend to be that URL as it's not a FQDN. If there's any kind of HTTPS certificate validation that URL seems pretty useless in general. Maybe it's some kind of internal testing server that made it into production?