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> I don't check or audit my CA's and don't think most people do either. The people responsible for running the root stores do. And when CAs screw up, they are

> I don't check or audit my CA's and don't think most people do either. The people responsible for running the root stores do. And when CAs screw up, they are nuked from orbit--this has happened a few times. And they can be proactive: when Kazakhstan announced they would require all TLS connections to be MITM'd, the browsers promptly added the MITM certificate to the root store with the explicit distrust bit set, meaning that the resulting certificate error can't be clicked through, effectively breaking the internet if you tried to use that for MITM (which put the kibosh on that plan immediately). And for another thing, I wouldn't trust the people who run the nameservers any more intrinsically than CAs. After all, the TLD that runs most of the commercial internet (.com) is run by a company that had problems when it ran a CA. There's no way to route around an untrustworthy TLD operator, and it needs to be recalled that many TLDs are literally run by state governments. And several of those governments believe the privacy of their citizens to be a bug, not a feature; giving them a more prominent role in securing privacy is not a good thing.

matthew9219 3y ago
Everybody has to do business somewhere. Nobody can prevent the government in whose territory they do business from compromising them. The question is whether you can be compromised by all governments (TLS) or just your government (TLS+DNSSec).
agwa 3y ago
> The people responsible for running the root stores do. And when CAs screw up, they are nuked from orbit--this has happened a few times The CAs that got the boot were detected because they issued certificates that were obviously invalid, for example for domains like example.com (Symantec), test.com (Certinomis), or domains that didn't even exist (Camerfirma). A CA that issues an unauthorized certificate for some random domain won't be detected unless that domain's owner is monitoring CT because no one else knows if the certificate is authorized or not. So please do monitor CT for your domains and don't just rely on root stores and security researchers to do so.

matthew9219 3y ago

Everybody has to do business somewhere. Nobody can prevent the government in whose territory they do business from compromising them. The question is whether you can be compromised by all governments (TLS) or just your government (TLS+DNSSec).

agwa 3y ago

> The people responsible for running the root stores do. And when CAs screw up, they are nuked from orbit--this has happened a few times The CAs that got the boot were detected because they issued certificates that were obviously invalid, for example for domains like example.com (Symantec), test.com (Certinomis), or domains that didn't even exist (Camerfirma). A CA that issues an unauthorized certificate for some random domain won't be detected unless that domain's owner is monitoring CT because no one else knows if the certificate is authorized or not. So please do monitor CT for your domains and don't just rely on root stores and security researchers to do so.