4 ms·

TLS security is rooted in DNS. It's ACME DNS-01. If your threat model includes nation states, this is a non-solution

Avamander 3y ago
If your threat model includes nation-states then DNSSEC won't help you either. WebPKI at least has a method for keeping track of and detecting misissuance, DNSSEC doesn't.
rakoo 3y ago
Wrong, TLS security is independent from DNS. If my threat model includes nation states I'll trust my own certificates or my very own CA.
- teddyh 3y ago
  By trusting certificates, you implicitly trust all CAs, not just your own.
  - rakoo 3y ago
    No, again in that threat model I can decide exactly which certificates and which CA I trust, one by one.
  - tptacek 3y ago
    You trust your browser's root program, not "all CAs".
    - teddyh 3y ago
      That’s what a “CA” is. If someone is not in a browser’s CA list, they’re not a CA. So yes, you do trust all CAs.
      - tptacek 3y ago
        No, obviously, different TLS programs have different root programs.
      - acdha 3y ago
        That’s not all what CA means in standard usage. Terms like WebPKI exist specifically to make that distinction since, for example, the U.S. government runs its own certificate authorities which are trusted by millions of clients and even some mainstream software (Adobe) but not browsers. This is far from unique as far as governments go, and in some cases may even be required within a country.
        teddyh 3y ago
        Those non-web CAs are not the topic of discussion, though. When we are discussing the DNSSEC PKI, we are not discussing any altroots¹. When people are discussing the CA system for TLS, they overwhelmingly mean the normal web CAs. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root
        tptacek 3y ago
        "The normal web CAs" means "the Mozilla and Chrome root programs". There are other CAs, and some of them are even in the root stores of other browsers, but they're not "trusted" in the sense you meant upthread.
shp0ngle 3y ago
If your threat includes nation states then DNSSEC is double-useless?

If your threat model includes nation-states then DNSSEC won't help you either. WebPKI at least has a method for keeping track of and detecting misissuance, DNSSEC doesn't.

rakoo 3y ago

Wrong, TLS security is independent from DNS. If my threat model includes nation states I'll trust my own certificates or my very own CA.

teddyh 3y ago
By trusting certificates, you implicitly trust all CAs, not just your own.
- rakoo 3y ago
  No, again in that threat model I can decide exactly which certificates and which CA I trust, one by one.
- tptacek 3y ago
  You trust your browser's root program, not "all CAs".
  - teddyh 3y ago
    That’s what a “CA” is. If someone is not in a browser’s CA list, they’re not a CA. So yes, you do trust all CAs.
    - tptacek 3y ago
      No, obviously, different TLS programs have different root programs.
    - acdha 3y ago
      That’s not all what CA means in standard usage. Terms like WebPKI exist specifically to make that distinction since, for example, the U.S. government runs its own certificate authorities which are trusted by millions of clients and even some mainstream software (Adobe) but not browsers. This is far from unique as far as governments go, and in some cases may even be required within a country.
      - teddyh 3y ago
        Those non-web CAs are not the topic of discussion, though. When we are discussing the DNSSEC PKI, we are not discussing any altroots¹. When people are discussing the CA system for TLS, they overwhelmingly mean the normal web CAs. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root
        tptacek 3y ago
        "The normal web CAs" means "the Mozilla and Chrome root programs". There are other CAs, and some of them are even in the root stores of other browsers, but they're not "trusted" in the sense you meant upthread.

shp0ngle 3y ago

If your threat includes nation states then DNSSEC is double-useless?