Just to play devil's advocate for fun... what follows is not a sincerely held position on my part, just enjoying the dialogue— I don't want a lion to eat me. B

Just to play devil's advocate for fun... what follows is not a sincerely held position on my part, just enjoying the dialogue— I don't want a lion to eat me. But I don't have a moral complaint against the lion for wanting to, trying to, or even succeeding. I'd be pissed, of course, but my objection is purely that I don't want to be eaten at all, period. There's not a moral dimension to it at all. I also don't want YOU to eat me. But unlike the lion, I DO have a moral objection against you, on top of the simple not-wanting-to-be-eaten-at-all thing. In conjunction with that, I find that I also have a moral objection against MYSELF, when it comes to the thought of ME eating YOU. So, although I don't know for sure yet what the basis of that moral objection is, I have learned that there does exist one. And, I can conjecture that whatever the foundation of that objection is, that's the same basis for my moral objection against you eating me. But, whatever that basis is, it doesn't seem to apply to a lion who wants to eat me, because I don't morally object against the lion. So, although that doesn't guarantee anything one way out the other just yet, perhaps it's justified that I don't feel any moral discomfort with me eating the lion[0], while absolutely having immense moral discomfort with you doing so, or even really wanting to. The situation, morally, with the lion seems to be a different thing, morally, than you eating me or vice-versa. ([0] This is speaking in the moral abstract, anyway—as it happens, there's not really enough lions left in the world to waste eating them, but that's separate from the question of whether it's moral to do so in general, if situational stuff like species extinction and other ($n)th-order effects weren't a factor).