3 ms·
Well what are you going to do when you have to run something you don't trust? Can't run TLS termination on an isolated host, because then the traffic to the or
by toast0 3y ago
Well what are you going to do when you have to run something you don't trust?
Can't run TLS termination on an isolated host, because then the traffic to the origin goes over the network, which you also don't trust.
Don't want to run OpenSSL integrated into the daemon, because OpenSSL is garbage.
Couldn't run anything else in the immediate aftermath of Heartbleed, because GnuTLS was worse, and LibreSSL and BoringSSL hadn't been released yet.
- tptacek 3y agoIf you really don't trust it, you run it inside a virtual machine. The truth is, you really do trust OpenSSL. You just trust it less than other things. That's fine! Layer controls on top of it. In Linux-land, this is the point where you'd start thinking about things like seccomp-bpf. A truly untrusted workload is, like, a compute job you've accepted from a SAAS customer; it's arms-length multitenancy. You can't share kernels in that situation.
- sophacles 3y agoWorth pointing out that VM escape is a thing too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_machine_escape https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_machine_escape
- tptacek 3y agoIt is. It's a much smaller attack surface.
- GauntletWizard 3y agoI'm unconvinced it is. All of those virtual hardware drivers require their own code, often at kernel privilege. Hypervisor functionality at the processor level helps but is a huge attack surface in itself. X86 "rings" are under tested because it's hard to - many violations just kill your whole VM, but more importantly there's a ton of instructions that access "physical" memory and the state of the page mapper, even at the ring-0 level, matters a lot. I do think VMs are likely more secure than containers in a cloud environment, because of course at that level you have both problems, but I don't believe that.the number of vulnerabilities found at the VM layer is at all reflective of their actual vulnerability.
- tptacek 3y agoIt simply is. Even in a heavyweight VM with lots of hardware support, those hardware drivers are a tiny fraction of the user/kernel interface, no matter how you choose to count it (lines of code, number of foreign calls, number of exposed modules). If you don't want to derive this axiomatically, fair enough: count vulnerabilities. The tally you're looking for is every Linux LPE versus every Linux KVM escape.