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Presumably pilots know to do that? I absolutely agree that psychological acceptability is key for building secure systems, and that the human factor must not b
by ngneer 3y ago
Presumably pilots know to do that?
I absolutely agree that psychological acceptability is key for building secure systems, and that the human factor must not be neglected. I also agree that process and culture around security are deeply broken. I just do not agree with the idea that if all are doing it, there must be some deep truth beneath. Yes, people habits must not be ignored, but to claim that an idea that goes against those habits is wrong, as the author claims, is inaccurate.
- JohnFen 3y ago> I just do not agree with the idea that if all are doing it, there must be some deep truth beneath. I think it does say that there's a deep truth underneath. That deep truth is that the "correct" way is not good enough. The way that it's not good enough may very well be that it doesn't mesh well with how people work or think. That aspect is as important as any other aspect of design.
- ngneer 3y agoInteresting viewpoint. I can see why it indicates the "correct" way is not easy or foolproof enough, but this is all it says. Ease of use is certainly an important aspect of design. I just think "not good enough" and "wrong" are two different things.
- JohnFen 3y agoWell, I think that if something is "not good enough" to the point where people actively avoid using it, that elevates it to "incorrect".
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- lelanthran 3y ago> I just do not agree with the idea that if all are doing it, there must be some deep truth beneath. Hypothetically, lets say you design a system that, for every legitimate 1000 users accessing it, 999 fail to understand it enough to gain their legitimate access. Would you still be comfortable telling the people that paid for the system that it's not the system that's wrong, but the users?
- ngneer 3y agoThat is for sure a broken system. I would not feel comfortable telling users they are wrong, even if the numbers were 10 out of 1000 or less. But we might be talking about different things. I gave the example of developers building a hopefully secure system, not users using it. If your point is that developers are users of languages, and that 1 in 1000 succeeds in building a secure system, then indeed languages are broken. But are you really arguing against input sanitization?
- lelanthran 3y agoI'm not arguing against input sanitisation, I'm just arguing (rather poorly, it seems) that if the majority of folks are skipping some security feature, then the feature is not well enough designed. I'm for input sanitisation, I'm against having it optional and left up the the developer. Typing on a phone makes me unnecessarily brief, apologies.
- ngneer 3y agoAh, that we agree on!